


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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL Monterey, California



THESIS

THE SOVIET NORDIC NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONE PROPOSAL

by

Catherine Anne Lumsden

June 1990

Thesis Advisor: Dr. James J. Tritten

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
1a REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED			1b RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS		
2a SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY			3 DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT		
2b DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE					
4 PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)			5 MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)		
6a NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School	6b OFFICE SYMBOL (if applicable) Code 38	7a NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION			
6c ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) Monterey, CA 93943-5100		7b ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)			
8a NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING ORGANIZATION	8b OFFICE SYMBOL (if applicable)	9 PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER			
8c ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)		10 SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS			
		PROGRAM ELEMENT NO	PROJECT NO	TASK NO	WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO
11 TITLE (Include Security Classification) THE SOVIET NORDIC NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONE PROPOSAL					
12 PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) Catherine A. Lumsden					
13a TYPE OF REPORT Master's Thesis	13b TIME COVERED FROM _____ TO _____	14 DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) JUNE 1990	15 PAGE COUNT 132		
16 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION The views in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.					
17 COSATI CODES			18 SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)		
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP	ARMS CONTROL SCANDENAVIA		
			NUCLEAR FREE ZONES		
19 ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) An examination of the Nordic Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) proposal and its ramifications for NATO, the United States and the West. A Nordic NWFZ would be detrimental to US, NATO and Nordic national security interests. Agreement on a NWFZ is not likely by the United States, Soviet Union, Denmark, Norway, Finland, Iceland, Greenland and Sweden. The debate breaks down to a "tug of war" between the two superpowers. It is not the nuclear weaponry but the politics surrounding the weaponry that is the heart of the nuclear free zone debate. By leaving out politics, one is ignoring the true sources of conflict and instability. Changing world politics demand that the West develop a unified strategy toward the Soviet Union and its initiatives. Through NATO it must preserve its vital economic, political and military objectives in the Northern Flank. Flexible naval forces and strong political and economic ties to the governments of the nations bordering the Baltic are essential. Strong NATO Naval forces operating					
20 DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED <input type="checkbox"/> SAME AS RPT <input type="checkbox"/> DTIC USERS			21 ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED		
22a NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL Professor James J. Tritten			22b TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) (408) 646-2143	22c OFFICE SYMBOL NS/Tr	

DD Form 1473, JUN 86

Previous editions are obsolete

S/N 0102-LF-014-6603

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

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in the waters of the Baltic must be seen as guarantors of the West's strategic aims and interests. A Nordic NWFZ would prevent this.

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The Soviet Nordic Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Proposal

by

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Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

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ABSTRACT

The thesis examines the Nordic Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) proposal and its ramifications for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United States and the West. The central theme running through each Soviet proposal has been the removal of the American nuclear guarantee. Preservation of US national security interests and hence US ability to extend its forward defense would be gravely threatened by a Nordic NWFZ. A Nordic NWFZ would be detrimental to US, NATO and Nordic national security interests. However, unilateral agreement on a NWFZ is not likely by the anticipated members of the Nordic NWFZ (United States, Soviet Union, Denmark, Norway, Finland, Iceland, Greenland and Sweden.) The United States has military installations in Iceland and Greenland and the banning of nuclear weaponry during wartime is inconceivable. The question then arises as to which nation or groups of nations will dominate and which will acquiesce. Inevitably the debate breaks down to a "tug of war" between the two superpowers. It is not the nuclear weaponry but the politics surrounding the weaponry that is the heart of the nuclear free zone debate. By leaving out politics, one is ignoring the true sources of conflict and instability. Changing world politics demand that the West develop a unified strategy toward the Soviet Union and its initiatives. Through NATO it must preserve its vital economic, political and military objectives in the Northern Flank. Flexible naval forces and strong political and economic ties to the

governments of the nations bordering the Baltic are essential. Strong NATO naval forces operating in the waters of the Baltic must be seen as guarantors of the West's strategic aims and interests. A Nordic NWFZ would prevent this.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Soviet attempts to influence the Nordic NATO nations to designate the Nordic region a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) are part of a campaign to weaken the Alliance. The motivations driving the Soviet Union's promotion of a Nordic NWFZ constitute a continuation of war through peaceful measures.

Ironically, the Scandinavian nations are already nuclear-free and the establishment by treaty of a Nordic NWFZ would in fact be a de jure recognition of Scandinavia's status; a promise of the continuation of the nuclear free status. The Soviets are seeking a promise of the continuance of the nuclear free status in the future. NWFZs are not new to the Kremlin. Gorbachev is not the first Soviet leader to propose the designation of the Nordic area as a NWFZ. The primary theme running through each Soviet proposal has been the removal of the American nuclear guarantee. US national security interests and the US ability to extend guarantees to allies would be gravely threatened by a Nordic NWFZ.

A NWFZ would supposedly ensure that the territory in question is entirely free of nuclear weapons. The participating states would refrain from the manufacture, acquisition, control, transit, stationing, and storage of such weapons. The Soviet Union considers itself exempt from such restrictions. "No part of the Soviet Union could become part of a Nordic nuclear-free zone,

not even the Baltic..."¹ As both a nuclear power that is also a superpower, the Soviet Union considers its territory exempt from nuclear weapon restrictions. It can be argued that the Kremlin considers nuclear weapons as necessary for the continuance of its superpower status,

"Therefore neither can its (Soviet) territory nor any part thereof be included in a nuclear-weapon-free zone or in a so-called 'security belt' adjacent to the nuclear-free zone; nor can the stipulations of the nuclear-free zone be an obstacle to navigation by Soviet vessels in the straits of the Baltic Sea, regardless of the type of weapons they carry."²

This logic however does not carry through for the "other superpower". US nuclear capabilities would be prohibited from a Nordic NWFZ. Without the American nuclear guarantee, Western European allies would not be able to withstand a Soviet-led attack. "The strategic protection of Europe is as strong or as weak as the American strategic guarantee, no matter what American weapons are deployed under NATO."³

Nordic NWFZ proposals are receiving increased attention and will continue to do so in the future. Nuclear disarmament by the year 2000 is the goal that Chairman Gorbachev has set for the world. "The Soviet Union proposes that a step-by-step,

¹Erling Bjøl, "Nordic Security" Adelphi Papers Number 181 (London: The International Institute For Strategic Studies, 1983), p. 28.

²Ibid.

³McGeorge Bundy, "Strategic Deterrence Thirty Years Later - What Has Changed?", International Institute For Strategic Studies, Twenty-First Annual Conference on The Future of Strategic Deterrence, Plenary Session, 6 September 1979, p.7.

consistent process of ridding the earth of nuclear weapons be implemented and completed within the next 15 years, before the end of the century."⁴ The Soviets propose the "complete elimination of medium-range missiles of the USSR and the USA in the European zone - both ballistic and cruise missiles - as a first step towards ridding the European continent of nuclear weapons."⁵

Soviet statements make it clear that the Soviet Union is sincere in the goal of nuclear disarmament for every other nation, particularly the nations which form the perimeter of the Soviet Union.⁶ "Aggregated on a map, they virtually encircle the Soviet Union providing a defense buffer."⁷ When it comes to nuclear disarmament for the Soviet Union, that is another matter all together. As in all Soviet pledges one must examine the actions behind the statements. Soviet actions do not support claims for Soviet compliance with nuclear disarmament in Scandinavia. If the Soviet Union cannot come to grips with nuclear

⁴"Nuclear Disarmament By The Year 2000" Statement by Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, The New York Times, February 5, 1986, p. A13.

⁵"Nuclear Disarmament By The Year 2000" p. A13.

⁶It is interesting to note that when one links the regions that the Soviet Union would like to see designated as NWRZs, these regions encircle the Soviet Union. Moscow believes that peripheral security of the Soviet Union must be maintained as without this security, the Soviets are vulnerable. But the Soviets also realize that the maintenance of peripheral security represents the weakest link in their chain of security measures.

⁷James J. Tritter, Naval Arms Control: An Idea Whose Time Has Yet To Come NPS-56-8^a-015, August 1989, p. 9.

disarmament in a small region such as Scandinavia, it is doubtful if the Kremlin could conform to nuclear disarmament elsewhere.

The "common European home" theme prevalent in contemporary Soviet rhetoric reminds one of the Soviet "inner seas strategy". The "inner seas strategy" deals with the Baltic region. Moscow would like to see the region designated as a closed seas open only to the littoral nations of the region. This same logic can be applied to the Soviet perception of a Nordic NWFZ - a zone closed to "outsiders" but open to the Soviets. The American military would be ousted. Gorbachev seeks the elimination of the American military presence in Europe. The Soviet Union has long been trying to oust the United States from Europe. What is new is Gorbachev and his astute diplomatic skills. The new dimension in Soviet politics will not allow the Soviet Union to be weighed in terms defined by the United States.

The Nordic NWFZ proposal provides a very attractive platform for Gorbachev to exercise his diplomatic and maneuvering skills. The Nordic region outside the Soviet Union is politically stable and cohesive and does not have nuclear weapons on its soil. Moscow seeks to ban the US nuclear presence in the North and subsequently to drive a wedge between the United States and its Northern allies.

The United States has historically demilitarized following each war. Now that the Cold War is professed to be over, the United States appears to be on the verge of another demilitarization. Budget cuts and public opinion complicate US resolve to remain in Europe. This will inevitably effect the

proposed Nordic NWFZ and could alter its structure for the United States, NATO and the USSR.

"The Nordic NWFZ is a good example of a proposal that has been under consideration for many years but still faces strong obstacles to its coming into being."⁸ It is not the nuclear weaponry but the politics surrounding the weaponry that is the heart of the nuclear free zone debate. By leaving out politics, one is ignoring the true sources of conflict and instability. Definition, geographic scope, negative security guarantees, verification and compliance only complicate not clarify the issue of NWFZs. The idea of NWFZ in general is self-defeating. Unilateral agreement on any of these issues is not likely by the anticipated members of the Nordic NWFZ (United States, Soviet Union, Denmark, Norway, Finland, Iceland and Greenland.) The United States has military installations in Iceland and Greenland and the banning of nuclear weaponry during wartime is inconceivable. The question then arises as to which nation or nations will dominate and which will acquiesce. Inevitably the debate breaks down to a "tug of war" between the two superpowers. Changing world politics demand that the West develop a unified strategy toward the Soviet Union and its initiatives. "The US generally takes the position that it cannot and will not negotiate Allied nuclear forces while the Soviet Union views all

⁸Ronald G. Purver "Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones And The Nordic NWFZ Proposal" Arctic Arms Control: Constraints And Opportunities, Occasional Paper Number 3, Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, February 1988, p. 11.

weapons that are capable of hitting its homeland as 'strategic.'"⁹
The United States must not back down from this position for "...the Soviet Union necessarily relies to a critical degree on its Arctic territories for the basing of the most secure element of its nuclear retaliatory force, its ballistic missile submarines. It would be in the interests of neither the Soviet Union nor the West to compromise the relative invulnerability of these forces by the application of arbitrary geographic restrictions."¹⁰

⁹James J. Tritten Naval Arms Control: An Idea Whose Time Has Yet To Come NPS-56-89-015, August 1989, p. 7.

¹⁰Purver, p. 8.

II. BACKGROUND

A Nordic NWFZ equates to a geographic "stand off zone"¹¹ of American nuclear weaponry. This is not acceptable. Nations cannot be partitioned into "stand off zones" of any sort particularly if it is done to enhance another nation's military and political objectives. "Washington expressly opposes the creation of a Nordic nuclear-free zone, on the basis that it would (1) complicate arms control in Europe, (2) harm alliance cohesion and cooperations, (3) severely restrict NATO's policy of flexible response in northern Europe, and (4) not take into full account Soviet nuclear weapons in the area." Consideration of the long-term effects of a Nordic NWFZ is foremost. A Nordic NWFZ does not conform to the ideals of Western Security either in the short-term or the long-term.

The current popularity of the Soviet Union coupled with the recent events in Eastern Europe encourage those not well-versed in Sovietology to believe that the Kremlin has "reformed" and that democracy is the inevitable outcome for the Soviet Union. Associated with this rationale is the naive assumption that now is the time to unite with the Soviet Union and disarm. This thinking is very dangerous. The United States must not and cannot think that the Soviet Union has altered its goal of world domination. Its tactics may be new but its objective has not wavered.

¹¹Ibid., p. 9.

Gorbachev is wholly committed to the communist goal of world domination and the United States and the West is playing into his hands. In 1937, Gorbachev stated in his senior thesis,

'War to the hilt between communism and capitalism is inevitable. Today, of course, we are not strong enough to attack. Our time will come in thirty to forty years. To win, we shall need the element of surprise. The Western world will have to be put to sleep. So we (the Soviet Union) shall begin by launching the most spectacular peace movement on record. There shall be electrifying overtures and unheard of concessions. The capitalist countries, stupid and decadent, will rejoice to cooperate to their own destruction. They will leap at another chance to be friends. As soon as their guard is down, we shall smash them with our clenched fists.'¹²

A Nordic NWFZ is just another Soviet bid at Western manipulation. The groundwork has been laid and in light of the recent events in the communist world, one can easily see that the above forecast is uncomfortably closer to reality. Moscow is very willing to "wait it out" for "...the Soviet leadership seems content to play a waiting game, using considerable experience and expertise in the field of subversion to erode rival influences...and promote the emergence of governments likely to be complaisant or even act as surrogates. In fact, the best of both worlds from the Soviet point of view, would be to achieve the fruits of successful military enterprise without having undertaken the risks."¹³

¹²Dimitry Manullski, Professor at the Lenin School of Political Warfare in Moscow, 1930 as quoted by Mikhail Gorbachev in his senior class thesis circa 1937.

¹³W.T. Roy "The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone and Regional Security (With Special reference to Sea Lanes of Communication)" Journal of the Australian Naval Institute, Volume 15, Number 3, August 1989, pp. 34-35.

A Nordic NWFZ would gravely diminish NATO. The adoption of a NWFZ by a portion of NATO would greatly undermine the flexible response of the Alliance. "It is precisely because of a heavy investment in military strength that Europe enjoys considerable stability in security terms today; and it is clear that unilateral reduction of the Western military presence would undermine that stability."¹⁴ NATO's flexible response doctrine is based on the requirement of maintaining adequate conventional and nuclear forces, at force levels adequate to deter Soviet aggression. The support of the Nordic nations is an absolute prerequisite.

Gorbachev's most recent proposal for a NWFZ reflects long-standing interests in controlling the region. Johan Jorgen Holst labels the NWFZ as "...primarily an instrument designed to influence the nature of peacetime relations."¹⁵ The proposal has met with much opposition and skepticism in the West. Danish Defence Minister Bernt Johan Collet rejected the Soviet Union's proposal and stated that this would 'damage the North Atlantic bloc'.¹⁶ Moscow counters such reservations as echoing the Pentagon's non-acceptance of the creation of a Nordic nuclear-free zone and the continuance of the US build up of military activity

¹⁴Christoph Bertram, "Europe's Security Dilemmas" Foreign Affairs, Summer 1987, p. 945.

¹⁵Johan Jorgen Holst, "Norwegian Security Policy: The Domestic Context" in Geoffrey Till, ed., Britain and NATO's Northern Flank (London: Macmillan, 1988)

¹⁶"Danish Minister's Rejection of Proposals Viewed" LD212034 TASS 21 Jan 88, FBIS-SOV-88-014, 22 Jan 88, pp. 29-30.

in the region.¹⁷ Evident is the distrust in Soviet policies and shared Nordic sentiment that the destruction of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles will have a detrimental effect on the world situation.¹⁸ Despite official opposition to the zone by Nordic leaders, Moscow contends that a Nordic NWFZ is "in the interest of the peoples of northern Europe as the absolute majority of people in Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Norway, Iceland declare for the easing of tension, for a nuclear weapons-free north, for broad cooperation of all concerned countries in the region."¹⁹ But is it? This is a much too simplistic interpretation of Nordic debates regarding the establishment of a Nordic nuclear-free zone.

A general attitude toward national security in Soviet NWFZ proposals has emerged. "The consolidation of international security also has a domestic political angle for the restructuring cause in the USSR and other socialist countries."²⁰ The Kremlin seeks the accomplishment of its foreign policy goals through more assertive political means; means less expensive than military means, particularly at a time when all available resources necessary to rebuild the Soviet Union domestically must be

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸"Military-Political Situation in N. Europe Viewed" LD091758 Moscow International Service in Finnish 7 Feb 88 FBIS-SOV-88-027 10 Feb 1988, p. 45.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰"Pact Military Doctrine Aims To Prevent War" AU2609172188 Moscow Kommunist in Russian No 13, Sep 88 (Signed to Press 25 Aug 88) pp. 110-119 - For Official Use Only, FBIS-SOV-88-190, 30 September 1988, p. 4.

channeled in different directions. Cited are "...the need to consolidate any trends that promote international security, on the one hand, and the shift of emphasis to political means of ensuring national security, on the other..."²¹ "The primary implications of these fundamental changes for Soviet national security policies are increased subordination of foreign policy to domestic priorities and the necessity to reduce investments in the defense sector...a new Soviet strategy is emerging that calls for arms control agreements to reduce the Western threat and thereby allow Gorbachev to cut Soviet defense expenditures with minimal adverse effect on Soviet military advantages."²²

Complicating the issue of NWFZs is the overall issue of arms control. Arms control has conformed to the changing global environment and William Van Cleave states that,

"Arms control is now almost purely political. The strategic standards for evaluating it and the very meaning of the term itself have become obscured. Politically, arms control has become a normative, rather than a descriptive, term. Like disarmament, it apparently has become an end in itself, rather than a means to national security ends."²³

The Soviet Union and the United States have very different expectations for arms control. This difference in expectations stems from the inequitable concentration of armed forces held by the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO). "In the years of intensive

²¹Ibid., p. 5.

²²Ibid., p. 21.

²³William R. Van Cleave, "The Arms Control Record: Successes And Failures" in Richard F. Staar, ed., Arms Control Myth Versus Reality, (Stanford, Ca.: Hoover Institution Press, 1984), p. 20.

buildup in the military might of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact a by no means symmetrical picture of the state of armed forces and arms has emerged in the West and East Europe."²⁴ This asymmetry is a direct correlation of the way in which the superpowers view arms control. "The Soviets stress that military factors have to be seen in an essentially political context. They feel that political reasons, notably arms negotiations, can both make the maintenance of military power less costly and help to bring about appropriate changes in the international system."²⁵

"The principal US aim in (strategic nuclear) arms control has always been to improve the survivability of deterrent forces and to lessen Soviet incentives for a surprise or pre-emptive attack."²⁶ Rear Admiral William O. Studeman, US Navy, Director of Naval Intelligence stated that,

"The Soviet Union under Gorbachev is also paying increased attention to international proposals for naval arms controls and constraints on naval operations...(such as) restricting naval activity in the Baltic, North, Norwegian, and Greenland Seas, including special limitations on ASW weapons, prior

²⁴"European Arms Control Prospects Viewed" PM03310152388 Moscow Izvestiya in Russian, 2 Oct 88, Morning Edition pp. 4-5, FBIS-SOV-88-192, 4 October 1988, p. 1.

²⁵Gerhard Wettig, "'New Thinking' on Security and East-West Relations" Problems of Communism, March-April 1988, p. 3.

²⁶William R. Van Cleave, "The Arms Control Record", Arms Control Myth Versus Reality, Richard F. Staar, ed., (Stanford, Ca.: Hoover Institution Press, 1984), p. 18.

notification of major naval exercises, and the presence of observers at such activities..."²⁷

One could then conclude that US goals in arms control in which the curtailment of naval activities is sought by the Soviet Union would be the insurance if not continued enhancement of US and NATO naval activity in the proposed region. In this aspect arms control can be considered a political instrument. It encourages cohesiveness as well as shared perceptions which lead to shared responsibility for the defense of the region by the United States and its allies. This requires political finesse.

A Nordic NWFZ proposal is both a political instrument aimed at reducing regional tension and a military instrument designed to reduce the flexibility of NATO. As a political instrument, a Nordic NWFZ conforms to the Soviet policy of reasonable sufficiency. Moscow is attempting to establish a Nordic NWFZ through political measures, thereby reducing the military significance of such a zone. The "party line" accentuates the political problems of security but does not diminish the military aspects of security.

"The basic premise of the concept is that security is primarily a political problem. In our time reasonable security of a country can be ensured only through a strategy representing an integral rational combination of the political, military, economic, ideological, humanitarian and other factors involved. **The dominant role in this complex is played by political factors.** There alone we can find the rational answer to the challenge presented to the security of the nations. In the political sphere the key to the solution

²⁷Statement of Rear Admiral William O. Studeman, U.S. Navy, Director of Naval Intelligence Before the Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on Intelligence Issues, 1 March 1988, pp. 24-25.

of the central problem of the security of each state separately and all of them taken together, to the limitation and reduction of armaments can be found."²⁸
(Emphasis added)

As a political instrument, a Nordic NWFZ is viewed as a Confidence Building Measure (CBM) or tension reduction technique. This appeals to nations such as Sweden which regard confidence building measures, particularly those involving the Barents Sea, as important not only on a bilateral basis between the superpowers, as is implied by the Soviet proposal, but on a broader, multilateral basis either through the United Nations or within the framework of the all-European process.²⁹ Sverre Lodgaard and Marek Thee in their work Nuclear Disengagement in Europe contend that,

"In northern and southern Europe, NWFZs would primarily be confidence-building measures (CBMs). They would have some military significance, but greater political importance. In time of crisis, they would function as early-warning systems -in the political rather than in the military sense...Generally, the zone arrangements should enhance stability and improve the conditions for crisis management, thereby strengthening the security of the member states and reducing tension between the major powers in two strategically important areas of the globe."³⁰

Richard Bitzinger states that,

"...a Nordic NWFZ would make an important contribution to international security, especially for the rest of Europe. The creation in Northern Europe of a NWFZ, by confirming the

²⁸"Academics Discuss 'Reasonable Sufficiency'" PM130735 Moscow New Times in English No. 40, 12 Oct 87, pp.13-15. FBIS-SOV-87-1987, 14 October 1987, p. 4.

²⁹"Sweden's Schori Briefs Press on Security Issues" PM291627 Izvestiya 29 Jan 88, FBIS-SOV-88-019, 29 Jan 88, pp. 31 -32.

³⁰Sverre Lodgaard and Marek Thee, Nuclear Disengagement in Europe (London: Taylor & Francis, Ltd., 1983), p. 6.

region as an area of low tension and stability, would have a positive effect on security in the rest of the continent."³¹

But would it? Within the interpretation of a Nordic NWFZ as a military instrument is the idea that such a zone would reduce the possibility of horizontal escalation. Horizontal escalation is defined as "...the idea that armed conflicts in one region can be escalated by opening new fronts elsewhere, at a significant distance from the original war theatre."³² Europe is still considered the primary focus of the Soviets, but the 'Europe first,'³³ rationale does not preclude horizontal escalation by the United States in the Pacific or elsewhere in the world. "...Zone arrangements could make Europe less sensitive to conflicts elsewhere and reduce the risk of a nuclear holocaust by horizontal escalation to Europe."³⁴

Factors motivating the Kremlin in the pursuance of a Nordic NWFZ are not complicated. Ridding Western Europe of the American nuclear guarantee is paramount. The break up of NATO is also a goal. These two goals lay the framework for the goal of dividing America and her allies in Europe. As stated earlier, NWFZ proposals are not new to the Kremlin or unique to Northern Europe.

³¹Richard Bitzinger, "Nordic Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zones: Prospects and Problems" Rand P-7356, August 1987, p. 9.

³²Lodgaard and Thee, pp. 5 - 6.

³³Prasert Chittiwatanapong "Japan's role in the Asia-Pacific Region" Korea and World Affairs, p. 568.

³⁴Lodgaard and Thee, p. 6.

Gorbachev seeks a NWFZ for the Indian Ocean³⁵ and the expansion of South Pacific NWFZ³⁶ as well.

"The overriding issue for Western Europe has been whether the United States has safeguarded its ability to extend deterrence guarantees to allies, or whether it might be tempted to neglect allied interests in pursuing a selfishly bilateral settlement with the Soviet Union."³⁷ Nowhere is collective security more tangible or more important than in Western Europe. Former United States Secretary of Defense, Frank Carlucci states that,

"Maintaining defense adequate to insure our collective security is well within our **economic** means - and our allies' as well. Whether we do so or not is a matter of **political** will."³⁸ (Emphasis added)

The United States and its Allies have an obligation to maintain the political will Mr. Carlucci speaks of. Establishment of a Nordic NWFZ could greatly complicate Western resolve.

The Nordic nations have a history of political stability and cohesiveness. Nordic cohesiveness has already been disrupted by

³⁵"Gorbachev Offers New Bids on Asian Policy" The Current Digest Of The Soviet Press, Volume XL, No. 38, October 19, 1988, p. 6.

³⁶Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Delivered at the Presentation of the Order of Lenin, Vladivostok, USSR, July 28, 1986, "International Affairs: Asia and the Pacific Region" Vital Speeches of the Day, September 15, 1986, p. 711.

³⁷David Yost, "Soviet Arms Control Policy in Europe," unpublished essay, p. 19.

³⁸Frank C. Carlucci, Former United States Secretary of Defense "America's Alliance Structure: The New Isolationism", Delivered at the Foreign Policy Association, New York, New York, May 5, 1988, Vital Speeches of the Day, June 1, 1988, p. 484.

the Soviet superiority within the region. Further Soviet influence by the Soviet Union would only drive the Nordic region further from the West and closer militarily and politically towards the Soviet Union. "...History shows that when a state accumulates too much military power in the region, the entire structure of northern European security begins to break down."³⁹ The Soviet Union seeks economic, military and political dominance of not just Northern Europe but all of Europe. The Soviet proposal for a Nordic NWFZ represents a major step in the fulfillment of the Soviet desire to control the Nordic region, and deprive the West of its influence and control in the region. When viewed in basic terms, the Soviet proposal for a Nordic NWFZ equates to a superpower struggle, with Nordic security as the prize.

³⁹Paul M. Cole, "The Northern Balance Changing Realities in Defending Northern Europe" Defense & Foreign Affairs, December 1986, p. 21.

III. GENERAL DISCUSSION OF ARMS CONTROL

Today the world is no longer a bipolar world but a multipolar world with five nations in possession of nuclear weapons and many more developing nuclear weapon capability. Further complicating the nuclear weapon issue is the fear that nuclear weapons could be used by sub-national groups such as terrorists against nations or other sub-national organizations. No longer does one have to fear nuclear threats or accidental use from only the superpowers. The diversity of nuclear warfare and the ease at which a nation or agency can develop or obtain nuclear weaponry has provided the impetus to keep areas free from nuclear weapons. It is believed that such regions are less likely to promote nuclear conflict. Is a NWFZ a viable option? Would the establishment of NWFZs benefit the United States or Soviet Union national security or degrade the national security interests of the nations and as a result the East and the West? As stated in Chapter 2, the United States has expressly opposed the Nordic NWFZ proposal reasoning that it would damage NATO cooperation. Would the establishment of NWFZs such as the Nordic NWFZ proposed for the North Atlantic signal a return to the bipolarity of the Cold War? The Soviet Union has long advocated the establishment of NWFZs in Europe but contends that the zones were never achieved for the West saw NWFZs as a breach of its political power.

"The idea of nonnuclear territories on the European continent has its history. Back in 1956 the Soviet Union proposed to create such a zone in Central Europe, in 1959 it proposed one in the Balkans, and in 1963 it proposed to declare the entire region of the Mediterranean a zone free of nuclear weapons. But each time these plans remained unrealized by virtue of the negative position of NATO countries, and the United States above all, saw them as a threat to their power politics."⁴⁰

NWFZs are no less of a threat to Western European and hence NATO security today. The basic strategic problem, set in a global context, facing the United States and its NATO allies today and tomorrow is the power to sustain the means to provide a forward defense in Europe while being able to project power to other regions of vital importance. Henry Kissinger in his article "The Future of NATO" states that,

"I believe that the defense of Europe and of the United States is indissoluble. I believe that the United States must guarantee the defense of Europe. But I believe that both Europe and the United States have a joint interest in developing a defense doctrine that our (US) leaders can explain to our publics over a extended period of time."⁴¹

The American nuclear guarantee is integral to the defense guarantee of which Kissinger speaks. For the past forty years NATO has maintained a nuclear emphasis within its defensive shield via the American nuclear guarantee for many reasons, one being that NATO refuses to pay the price for substitutes.

⁴⁰"Nonnuclear Zones: Important Factor of European Security" 18010401B Moscow Zarubezhnoye Voennoye Obozreniye in Russian No 5, May 88 (signed to press 5 May 88) pp. 9-12, JPRS-UFM-88-011, 31 October 1988, p. 5.

⁴¹Henry Kissinger, "The Future of NATO," The Washington Quarterly, vol. 2., no.4 (Autumn, 1979) p. 13.

The Soviet Union wants a Western Europe kept intact in the event of NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict. Sovietologists anticipate that the established agricultural, business, and industrial complexes already in place will be utilized to rebuild the Soviet empire which, should the Soviet Union be victorious, would include Western Europe. Dean Acheson, US Secretary of State, stated in 1949 that,

"They (the Soviets) need and want the people, industry and resources of Western Europe. They do not want to destroy them. Success in the cold war achieves this. The hot war may lose all this and more too...the loss of Western Europe or of important parts of Asia or the Middle East would be a transfer of potential from West to East, which, depending on the area, might have the gravest consequences in the long run."⁴²

Acheson's observation is just as true today.

It can be argued that the Kremlin considers nuclear weapons as necessary for the continuance of its superpower status. Superpower status of a country is measured in terms of military, political and economic might. "A country's security still cannot be ensured by political means alone, without armed forces that have been appropriately trained and equipped, is an indisputable truth."⁴³ A nation's military might is based upon the size of a country's arsenal, combat forces and the capability of the nation's

⁴²Dean Acheson, Memorandum by the Secretary of State, Washington, December 20, 1949, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Volume I, National Security Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy, (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 615.

⁴³"A Call to De-Emphasize Military Strength" The Current Digest Of The Soviet Press, Volume XL, No. 46, December 14, 1988, p. 1.

weapon systems. The calculation incorporates both conventional and nuclear forces. Arms control agreements are used by nations to:

1. limit the destructive potential of one or another nation's conventional and nuclear forces,
2. reduce risks of war,
3. or reduce costs.

"It appears that the Soviet Union views arms control less as a tool for achieving genuine stability and balance, and much more as a political tool for securing advantages either through actual agreements or through politics of the negotiating process itself."⁴⁴

It would appear that the Soviets are only serious about arms control as it benefits their objectives. This is no different from US intentions, but the Soviet Union seems to be more astute in negotiating its position in arms control than is the United States.

"The Soviet Union is not about to abdicate its superpower status, its military capabilities will remain a threat to those who do not trust its declarations of friendly intent."⁴⁵

One can then conclude that Arms Control is a Zero Sum Game, not a non-Zero Sum Game.

"Although it is extremely fashionable in the US and the West to think of arms control in terms of a 'non-zero sum game,' in which one side does not gain advantage over the other, arms control as

⁴⁴Charles A. Sorrels, Soviet propaganda campaign against NATO U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, October 1983, p. 34.

⁴⁵Christoph Bertram "Europe's Security Dilemmas" Foreign Affairs Summer 1987, p. 957.

a part of an overall national security strategy properly places it in the 'zero sum game camp.'"46

The West is very often guilty of mirror-imaging when interpreting Soviet initiatives and underlying motives. This is very dangerous for,

"There is little doubt that the Soviet leadership wants a different arms control and for different reasons than does the present (Reagan) US administration. Ironically, sometimes the use of the same terminology obscures the gap: strategic stability, for instance, is emphasized by both sides, but it carries profoundly different meanings for each."47

The United States no longer can assume that the Soviet Union views arms control or any other issue involving superpower competition in the same light as the United States. For example, the Soviet Union does not recognize the US definition of detente. The United States views the subject of detente as a whole whereas Moscow differentiates between political and military detente with political detente in support of and subordinate to military detente. Furthermore, political detente is subordinate to military detente, in Soviet eyes, only to the point that it enhances military detente.⁴⁸ "Continuing a persistent struggle for detente and prevention of war, the Soviet Union is doing everything necessary to strengthen the country's military might, to improve

⁴⁶James J. Tritten, Naval Arms Control: An Idea Whose Time Has Yet To Come, p. 21.

⁴⁷Dimitri K. Simes, "Are the Soviets Interested in Arms Control" The Washington Quarterly Spring 1985, p. 147.

⁴⁸Political Terms: A Short Guide (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1982) pp. 21-22.

the Soviet Armed Forces and to raise their combat capability and combat readiness in every possible way."⁴⁹ No longer can the United States reassure itself with claims that the Soviet Union and the United States foster similar objectives.

"The United States cannot expect the USSR to promote US national security interest through arms control agreements. The Soviets will surrender no advantage, and the United States has not the leverage to force them to do so. Experience shows that the United States is more likely to be constrained than helped by the negotiating process."⁵⁰

One quickly questions the sensibility of negotiating with the Soviets, particularly the issue of arms control. The Soviet Union has repeatedly violated previous treaty agreements with the construction of the Krasnoyarsk large phased-array radar (LPAR) facility being one of the most recent and most flagrant violations. It is a violation of the ABM Treaty⁵¹, a treaty that one would expect to be respected in anticipation of a meaningful NWFZ debate with the United States. "Symbolic arms control is, after all, always feasible, even if substantial arms control has proved

⁴⁹"The Evolution of Military Art: Stages, Tendencies, Principles" JPRS-UMA-89-012-L, 12 October 1989, p. 1.

⁵⁰William Van Cleave, "Arms Control Record" in Arms Control Myth Versus Reality, p. 19.

⁵¹The Krasnoyarsk LPAR clearly violates the ABM Treaty because of its location and orientation. Even though the Soviet military has turned the radar station over to the USSR Academy of Military Sciences, the United States still contends that the Krasnoyarsk LPAR, because of its capability to function as a ballistic missile detection and radar, is a violation of the ABM Treaty. Said violation can only be corrected by the dismantling of the radar.

historically largely impossible."⁵² Is a NWFZ at best a symbolic arms control maneuver?

"The enduring effectiveness of the American guarantee has not depended on strategic superiority. It has depended instead on two great facts: the visible deployment of major American military forces in Europe, and the very evident risk that any large-scale engagement between the Soviet and American forces would rapidly and uncontrollably (sic) become general, nuclear, and disastrous."⁵³

However, there is no guarantee that the Soviet nuclear deterrent would be diminished.

The basic criterion for negotiating with the Soviet Union should be the enhancement of US national security interests. In the case of the Nordic NWFZ proposal, not only is the national security interest of the United States at stake but that of its Scandinavian allies as well. By extension the security of Western Europe could be threatened for the security of Western Europe is enmeshed in the forward deployment strategy of the United States in the North.

A. OVERVIEW OF OTHER NWFZ PROPOSALS

Valuable insight can be provided by the Latin American NWFZ established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ). Concentration will be upon these two zones as similarities with the Nordic NWFZ are easily established. The Treaty of Tlatelolco established a Latin American NWFZ in a region that did not yet have nuclear weapons and elicited a promise

⁵²Ranger, p. 57.

⁵³Bundy, pp. 7-8.

from both superpowers not to introduce nuclear weapons into the region. Do the Soviets have another Treaty of Tlatelolco in mind for the Nordic nations of NATO?

Both the South Pacific and the Baltic are labelled as "closed seas" for one of the superpowers (The South Pacific has "all the characteristics of being an American lake, although that power's influence has been indirectly exerted, largely through surrogates in the ANZUS alliance system."⁵⁴ The Baltic has long been considered a "closed sea" by the Soviet Union. Both zones equate to de jure recognition of a nuclear free status.) Like the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone, SPNFZ was established in a region that did not have nuclear weapons. Like the Nordic NWFZ the establishment of SPNFZ was a de facto recognition of the South Pacific's already nuclear free status,

"...if it is agreed that the term 'Nuclear Free' is a synonym for 'Nuclear Weapons Free', then the South Pacific has always been deserving of being thus designated. None of its states has the technology to produce such weapons, nor do they store them on behalf of states that do."⁵⁵

However, the region within the SPNFZ "...was not an arena of superpower competition"⁵⁶ as is the Baltic and the surrounding waters of the Nordic NWFZ. The nuclear free status prior to SPNFZ "...was perceived by South Pacific states as having no **guaranteed**

⁵⁴W.T. Roy "The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone and Regional Security (With Special reference to Sea Lanes of Communication)" Journal of Australian Naval Institute, Volume 15, Number 3, August 1989, p. 27.

⁵⁵Roy, p. 27.

⁵⁶Ibid.

permanence."⁵⁷ The Soviet threat in the South Pacific has not been of military in nature but "...the appearance of Soviet influence in the South Pacific...is regarded as unwelcome or even threatening...."⁵⁸ so to ensure nuclear free status for the South Pacific and preclude further Soviet presence, SPNFZ was created. SPNFZ may or may not provide the guarantee of a Nuclear Free Zone (NFZ) that the South Pacific seeks. The guarantee has not been tested by conflict within the region, only after conflict particularly heightened conflict can the guarantee of a NFZ be tested.

The Latin American NWFZ established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco is considered as a model for emulation. It has been signed by all Latin American states except Cuba and ratified by all signatories except Argentina. The treaty "prohibits not only the acquisition of nuclear weapons by its parties but also the stationing of nuclear weapons within their territory...It provides for the conduct of such explosions by or for the benefit of its parties under international supervision but also contains a definition of 'nuclear weapons' that appears to preclude the possession or development of peaceful nuclear explosives by parties to the treaty."⁵⁹ The Latin American NWFZ is unique in that "there

⁵⁷Ibid.

⁵⁸Ibid.

⁵⁹Nuclear Arms Control Background And Issues, Committee on International Security and Arms Control, National Academy of Sciences (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1985), pp. 246 - 247.

were no nuclear weapons in the region; the regional initiative was originally supported by all of the region's principal states...and there was no serious impact on existing mutual security arrangements"⁶⁰Yes, but future mutual security arrangements may or may not be affected. Elimination of the American nuclear presence does not in itself guarantee peace. Erling Bjøl, Professor, Aarhus University in Denmark, recognizes that such a "Soviet-defined zone "...would not constitute any real guarantee for the security of the Nordic countries which declare their territory a nuclear-free zone."⁶¹

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 248.

⁶¹Erling Bjøl, "Nordic Security" Adelphi Papers Number 181 (London: The International Institute For Strategic Studies, 1983), p. 28.

IV. HISTORICAL PATTERN OF SOVIET NORDIC NWFZ PROPOSALS

"The campaign for a nuclear-free Nordic zone had its roots in Finland, although the idea was first advanced by the Soviet leadership in letters from Premier Bulganin to the Nordic Chiefs of Government in 1958 and was repeated by Khrushchev in his 1959 Riga speech."⁶² It should be noted that the idea of a Nordic NWFZ first emerged "in an era when the US Thor and Jupiter medium-range missiles were being considered for deployment by NATO European countries (they were accepted only in Britain, Italy, and Turkey)."⁶³ In 1982 Brezhnev "...fully endorsed the idea (military free zones) and called for states outside the Indian Ocean to freeze development of military bases and halt deployment of large naval fleets there."⁶⁴

Nuclear disarmament by the year 2000 is the goal that Chairman Gorbachev has set for the world. "The Soviet Union proposes that a step-by-step, consistent process of ridding the earth of nuclear weapons be implemented and completed within the next 15 years, before the end of the century."⁶⁵ Proposed is "...complete

⁶²J. Borawski and J. Valentine, "Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones: The Nordic Case" Naval Forces, Vol. 9:3, 1988, p. 67.

⁶³Ibid.

⁶⁴"Brezhnev proposes military free zones" Washington Times, 22 September 1982, p. 7.

⁶⁵"Nuclear Disarmament By The Year 2000" Statement by Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, The New York Times, February 5, 1986, p. A13.

elimination of medium-range missiles of the USSR and the USA in the European zone - both ballistic and cruise missiles - as a first step towards ridding the European continent of nuclear weapons."⁶⁶ The INF Treaty established the removal of all Pershing IIs and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs) from European soil. The Soviet Union advocates that "... the United States should undertake not to transfer its strategic and medium-range missiles to other countries."⁶⁷ This is a reference to the sale of Tridents to the United Kingdom by the United States.

The Soviet Union has historically advocated the establishment of NWFZs. There is a tendency for the misinformed individual to equate NWFZ proposals with Gorbachev and to forget what the Soviet Union is seeking to achieve. Sought is breathing space or peredyshka. The Soviet Union does not hide its strategy and its leader states that,

"...one can imagine the extensive untapped potential for peaceful coexistence that can be found in restructuring in the Soviet Union alone. By ensuring our (Soviet) attainment of the world level in all the most important economic indices, restructuring will make it possible for this huge and very rich country to join in the worldwide division of labor and resources as never before."⁶⁸

Soviet foreign policy has historically been very pragmatic and opportunistic. It is often complicated by trying to attain

⁶⁶Ibid.

⁶⁷Ibid.

⁶⁸"Gorbachev: 'New Thinking' in World Affairs", The Current Digest Of the Soviet Press, Volume XXXIX, No. 45, December 9, 1987, p. 14.

competing goals in which there are often one-for-one tradeoffs (i.e., increasing contact and openness with Western Europe versus maintaining strict control of Eastern Europe.) The ultimate triumph of removing the American presence in Europe is a long-term objective but one cannot assume that this goal would take precedence over all goals in Soviet decision-making, that there are no competing goals that put a restraint on Soviet efforts in this direction and that the Soviets have a single minded master plan intended to maximize conflict between the United States and Western Europe.

"...the Soviet Union has engaged the Atlantic Alliance in a long-term competition in peacetime. The Soviets have attempted to use the Western interests in arms control as a means of advancing their interests in the East-West competition - as an instrument to help move what they call 'the correlation of forces' in their favor; and in preparing for the unwanted and improbable contingency of war - as a means of undermining the West's military posture so that war outcomes will be more likely to favor the Soviet Union."⁶⁹

Gorbachev's Murmansk Address is seen as another vehicle for the movement of 'the correlation of forces' in the Soviets' favor. Sought is a de jure nuclear disarmament of the Nordic region but it is not difficult to perceive that the ultimate goal is the removal of the American nuclear guarantee from Europe.

"The Soviets feel that the establishment of NATO and the United States presence in Europe have deprived the USSR of an ideological, geographical, and power-based 'right' to dominate all of Europe...In order to achieve a position of dominance in an 'all-European' order, the Soviet Union has sought gradually to neutralize United States security guarantees to

⁶⁹David S. Yost, "Soviet Aims in Europe" Society, vol. 24, No. 5 (July/August 1987), p. 73.

Western Europe and to promote a reduction in the United States military and nuclear presence."⁷⁰

The Soviet Union has not altered its course, it has only adopted more sophisticated techniques in seeking its objectives. No longer can Soviet leaders pound their shoes on a table to get their point across. Nor can they demand compliance with their initiatives. But if their initiatives are packaged in terms palatable for the West using phrases such as CBMs and reasonable sufficiency then the likelihood of success in the Soviet achievement of its objectives is greatly enhanced. Gorbachev's Murmansk Address, an example of the sophisticated Soviet statesmanship that the world is witnessing today, speaks of a common heritage of the inhabitants of the Eurasian continent. This common heritage is linked with the need for a common European defense structure. What is not said is just as important as what is said for, by omission, the Soviet Union could be seeking a common defense structure void of the United States.

⁷⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 72-73.

A. GORBACHEV'S DESIGN: HIS MURMANSK ADDRESS

President Gorbachev delivered an address in Murmansk, USSR on October 1, 1987 which had profound implications for the "Nordic Balance". Direct and indirect statements were made which directed the audience's attention to the issue of nuclear warfare with special emphasis upon the Arctic and Northern Europe. Gorbachev speaks of a changing Soviet foreign policy. He states that,

"One of the elements of the change is that it is now hard to convince people that our foreign policy, the policy of the Soviet Union, our initiatives, our nuclear-free world program are mere 'propaganda'."⁷¹

Gorbachev speaks of concern for the world situation and states that "...our (Soviet) policy is an invitation to a dialogue, to a search, to a better world, to normalized international relations."⁷² "Normalized" is interpreted to mean a nuclear free environment as defined by the Soviet Union. The Soviet leader speaks of gaining favorable trends in his reference to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) by saying that "frank East-West dialogue (is) far from having no result for both sides...we are close to a major step in the field of real nuclear disarmament."⁷³

⁷¹"USSR Foreign Relations" Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Delivered in Murmansk, USSR, October 1, 1987, Vital Speeches of the Day, December 15, 1987, p. 130.

⁷²Gorbachev, p. 130.

⁷³Ibid.

President Gorbachev cites "The North (as a) problem of security for the Soviet Union, of its northern frontiers."⁷⁴ He claims that "major initiatives in the sphere of international security and disarmament are linked with the names of famous political figures of Northern Europe."⁷⁵ The implication is that the historical precedence has been set; it would only be natural for present Northern leaders to continue the trend. Referring to the NATO and the WTO, Gorbachev declares it possible "...to take simultaneously the roads of bilateral and multilateral cooperation"⁷⁶, citing 'our common European home' as the basis for cooperation.⁷⁷ "A home for all of Europe, a common European home...has become a lasting feature of (Soviet) political activities. Seen are references to the concept of a demilitarized Europe...European arms pools...European defense community...all-European infrastructure of strategic stability."⁷⁸

An inference emerges to the Soviet desire to circumvent the American military, most specifically the American nuclear presence in Europe. The Soviet Union and the Nordic nations are littoral nations sharing common borders whereas the United States is not.

⁷⁴Ibid., p. 132.

⁷⁵Ibid.

⁷⁶Ibid.

⁷⁷Ibid.

⁷⁸"ArticleViews Need for 'Common European Home'" PM 1710130188 Moscow Pravda in Russian 15 Oct 88, Second Edition, p. 4., FBIS-SOV-203, 20 October 1988, pp. 9-110.

The United States is an "outsider". "We (the Soviets) must also take account of geopolitical factors: the United States is overseas, the USSR is right alongside."⁷⁹ The Soviet Union seeks a diminishment of the American nuclear presence in the region. "Without American protection, Europe would be vulnerable to the Soviets' superiority in conventional forces."⁸⁰ The Soviet Union and the WTO already have a preponderance of conventional force in Europe, clearly holding the advantage over the United States and NATO not just in manpower but in geographic terms. The Soviet Union has the advantage of proximity to the region whereas the United States does not, even though the United States is aligned with two of the North European nations. "The combination of geographical position, conventional military superiority and a stand-off at the strategic-nuclear level gives the Soviet Union an overall military and, therefore, political advantage over the United States in the struggle for Europe."⁸¹

President Gorbachev proposes that "...all countries concerned should embark on talks on the limitation and scaling down of military activity in the North as a whole, in both the Eastern and

⁷⁹"European Arms Control Prospects Viewed" PM0310152388 Moscow Izvestiya in Russian 2 Oct 88, FBIS-SOV-88-192, 4 October 1988, "Arms Control & Disarmament", p. 1.

⁸⁰John Barry, Margaret Garrard Warner and Evan Thomas, "After The Cold War" Newsweek, May 15, 1989, p. 23.

⁸¹Francis P. Sempa, "Geopolitics And American Strategy: A Reassessment" Strategic Review, Spring 1987, p. 34.

Western Hemispheres."⁸² He defines his parameters for such limitation and delineates the following,

1. The willingness and the preparedness of the Soviet Union to act a guarantor of a nuclear weapon-free zone in Northern Europe but defers to the participating countries for the formalization of the guarantee, (Implied is the joint cooperation of the Soviet Union and the Nordic nations in the maintenance of such a zone).
2. Moscow's reaffirmation of its readiness to discuss with the Nordic nations, the problems relating to the creation of a nuclear-free zone, including possible measures to the Soviet territory and raises the possibility of removing Soviet ballistic missiles from the Soviet Baltic Fleet,
3. Welcomes the initiative of Finland's President Koivisto regarding the restriction of naval activity in the sea of Northern Europe,
4. Specifies the limitation measures such as arrangements on the limitations of rivalry in antisubmarine weapons, notification of large naval and air force exercises, invitation of observers from all countries participating in the "European process to large naval and air force exercises",
5. Proposes the banning of naval activity in mutually agreed zone of international straits and intensive shipping lanes and,
6. Encourages the cooperation of the Nordic nations in environmental protection, by setting an example through the monitoring of the natural environment and radiation safety in the region.⁸³

1. "New Thinking" or Just New Packaging?

The adoption of a Nordic NWFZ would not only remove the American nuclear guarantee from the Nordic region but also set a

⁸²"USSR Foreign Relations" Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Delivered in Murmansk, USSR, October 1, 1987, Vital Speeches of the Day, December 15, 1987, p. 132.

⁸³Ibid., pp. 132-133.

precedent for removal of the American nuclear guarantee from not only other areas of Europe but other regions of the world. The Soviet Union has enjoyed a geographical and conventional military power advantage in Eurasia.

"In geopolitical terms, China and Western Europe are two large weights on the peripheries of the Eurasian landmass adjacent to the Soviet Heartland. The effective control of either territory by the Soviet Union - through direct conquest or political hegemony - would drastically shift the 'correlation of world forces' in Moscow's favor."⁸⁴

Christoph Bertram in his article, "Europe's Security Dilemmas" states that,

"...Mr. Gorbachev's proposals for removing all Soviet and American nuclear weapons from the territory of Europe may genuinely be meant as a first step toward removing the threat of war, but they could also serve the old objective of making Europe safe for Soviet military dominance by removing the link between the security of Western Europe and that of the United States. Whatever tests the West may devise to evaluate the 'new thinking' in Moscow, they will yield ambiguous results."⁸⁵

Underlying the rationale for removing both Soviet and American nuclear weapons is the disengagement of Europe from the "two nuclear giants" Michael Howard in "A European Perspective on the Reagan Years" states that,

"'Europe,' both East and West, they (opposition groups within Europe) argue, should detach itself from the dominance of its alien masters and constitute itself a stable, nonaligned 'zone of peace' between the two nuclear giants. If Western Europe were to detach itself from the United States, so the thesis goes, the Soviet Union would no longer need to maintain its protective glacis in Eastern Europe, and the potentially

⁸⁴Francis P. Sempa, "Geopolitics And American Strategy: A Reassessment" Strategic Review, Spring 1987, p. 36.

⁸⁵Christoph Bertram, "Europe's Security Dilemmas" Foreign Affairs Summer 1987, p. 945.

lethal confrontation across the Iron Curtain would come to an end."⁸⁶

This is not the "mainstream" argument but one whose "plausibility is increased by the accommodating and reasonable attitude that Gorbachev's Russia is now beginning to adopt toward European affairs."⁸⁷

2. Zone of Peace Initiative

Professor Claude Buss of the Naval Postgraduate School contends that in making a threat analysis, one must consider possible threats within a 360 degree radius from where one sits. Using this same rationale, one must contemplate a Soviet analysis using Moscow as the center of the circle. The question then arises as to how far is the Kremlin willing to go to protect its radius. Threat analysis is just as real for the Soviet Union as it is for the United States. A dilemma arises in anticipation of an opponent's threat analyses and that is knowing when, where and how to maneuver. The West does not want to be outmaneuvered by the Soviet Union. It can not afford to move too fast but yet it must not allow itself to be outmaneuvered,

"...this is not the time to go slow in disarmament preparations or to hold Mr. Gorbachev and his initiatives at arm's length. We (United States) should seize the opportunity to cut deals we (United States) otherwise have wanted but have been unable to negotiate."⁸⁸

⁸⁶Michael Howard, "A European Perspective on the Reagan Years" Foreign Affairs, America and the World 1987/88, p. 491.

⁸⁷Ibid.

⁸⁸Jeremy J. Stone, "Let's Do All We Can for Gorbachev" The New York Times, February 6, 1989, p. A15.

The United States should lead the way for the West through the establishment of a positive policy. Sought is not just a response to negatives but a diminishment of a "us" versus "them" situation. Most importantly, the policy should not result in a counter-proposal adverse to US national security. Washington does not want to make the mistake of coming out against NWFZs in general.

Supporters of a NWFZ contends that such a zone would constitute a Zone of Neutrality (ZON). This is misleading for a ZON does not equate to a Zone of Peace (ZOP) or a NWFZ. Neutrality equates to nonalignment but not necessarily peace or the banishment of nuclear weapons. "The military doctrine of both the US and the Soviet Union (or indeed of any state) must contend with the fact that nuclear weapons have different and often contradictory aspects, depending upon the context in which they are viewed."⁸⁹ Strategic weapons are part of the global threat. How these weapons are perceived is critical. In other words, the threat perception of strategic weapons can often be more vital than the weapons themselves. "The maintenance of a military-strategic parity (balance) guarantees strategic stability"⁹⁰ with strategic stability as the goal. "The survival of the Soviet Union is found in its ability to meet the American threat. "The Soviet Union is just as vulnerable, as is the United States, to the forces which

⁸⁹John Van Oudenaren, "Deterrence, War-fighting and Soviet Military Doctrine," Adelphi Papers 210 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1986) p. 7.

⁹⁰The Evolution of Military Art: Stages, Tendencies, Principles" JPRS-UMA-89-012-L, 12 October 1989, p. 115.

throughout history have brought down every great empire. In many ways, the Soviet Union is more vulnerable..."⁹¹ The uncertainty of Gorbachev's tenure and the weakness of the Soviet economy make the Soviet Union more susceptible to collapse. "The Soviet economy is so 'unstable' that it easily could collapse in the face of a large shock such as a prolonged strike or widespread civil unrest."⁹²

a. Is It Really a Confidence Building Measure?

Frequent reference to CBMs are found throughout Soviet literature regarding arms control. But are NWFZs CBMs? The establishment of NWFZs would eliminate surprise attacks upon the Soviet homeland and Warsaw Pact nations. NWFZs like,

"...zones of reduced levels of arms would be created along the boundary between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and **confidence-building measures would be considerably expanded**, which would make it possible to carry out more painstaking reciprocal monitoring of the sides' military activity. This is of paramount importance, not the least for the creation of **reciprocal confidence**, at a time when Europe is 'crammed' with armed forces to an unprecedented degree and when the opposing sides have deployed enormous military might. This would indisputably not be able to replace the talks (arms control negotiations) themselves but it would, of course, be able to **alter their atmosphere - and that would be very valuable.**"⁹³
(Emphasis added)

Robin Ranger in his article "Learning From the Naval Arms Control Experience" states that "arms control regimes cannot be insulated from the broader political and military relationships

⁹¹Joseph C. Harsch "Moscow woes should reassure the US" The Christian Science Monitor, April 29, 1988, p. 11.

⁹²"U.S. report says economy of USSR will likely worsen" The Japan Times, April 22, 1990, p. 1.

⁹³"European Arms Control Prospects Viewed" FBIS-SOV-88-192, p. 2.

between the parties to them."⁹⁴ American approaches to nuclear deterrence and international stability have sometimes included an assumption that a universally valid strategic wisdom has been discovered in the United States, and that the Soviet Union should accept it. Examples include the effort during the SALT negotiations to 'educate' the Soviets about the merits of mutual vulnerability, the 1985 'strategic concept' of eliminating offensive nuclear forces in conjunction with the buildup of strategic defenses, and the proposals to encourage an evolution in the US and the USSR toward small, single-warhead ICBMS."⁹⁵

Too dangerous for the United States to assume that it holds the universally valid strategic wisdom mentioned above. The Soviet Union tends to believe that it holds the universally valid strategic wisdom.

A Nordic NWFZ is a CBM in that it would designate the North as nuclear weapon free but it would only appear as a CBM on paper. In reality, tensions would be heightened and the internal and external nations bordering the zone would be more susceptible to coercion and attack. A Nordic NWFZ is a CBM only for the Soviet Union for it would bolster Soviet confidence in the outcome of a potential NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict. The Soviet Union retains the advantage of proximity and any effort to eliminate nuclear weaponry

⁹⁴Robin Ranger, "Learning From the Naval Arms Control Experience" The Washington Quarterly Summer 1987, p. 56.

⁹⁵David S. Yost, Public Opinion, Political Culture, and Nuclear Weapons in the Western Alliance, third draft, May 1989, p. 20.

from an adversary, particularly its main adversary, the United States only serves to enhance the warfighting capabilities of the Soviet Union.

V. SOVIET MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE NORTH

Soviet naval exercises like those of the United States Navy are intended to improve the fleet's ability to function in accord with their strategy. For the Soviets, this means control of the flanks of Europe. Seen is a new dimension in the Soviet Navy of practicing, training and building a fleet to control the Atlantic right off American shores. "Peaceful training tasks"⁹⁶ designed to reinforce the defense capacity of the country is the official Soviet perception of its naval exercises. Soviet military officials state that naval exercise patterns are a reflection of a changed Soviet perception in the military doctrine of the "Imperialist States" (a strategic plan to disperse US Naval combatant ships in more ports and to make the job of blocking the US fleet with mines by a potential enemy more difficult) and detailed naval operations in support of a European conventional war. But, at first glance the alleged reduction in large exercises could be interpreted as indicative of a general trend within the Soviet Navy of reduced naval deployments. The Soviet Union has cosmetically cutback on overseas deployments and has stopped carrying out ambitious naval exercises from the Soviet territory. Marshal Sergei F. Akhromeyev, the Soviet military chief, while

⁹⁶Vladimir Chernavin, FBIS, 26 July 1985, p. V2.

visiting the United States in 1988, claimed that the cutback was "an example of Moscow's new effort to develop a purely defensive military doctrine."⁹⁷ This claim is designed to persuade NATO Europe of the Soviet commitment to arms reductions with the reduction of naval exercises cited as visible proof.

Defense is paramount to the Soviet Armed Forces. The Soviet Navy operates as part of a combined arms team and as such is part of a centralized Soviet military strategy. All Soviet military strategic planning is organized from the top down, on a unified basis, with the Soviet Navy traditionally ranked fifth.

Gorbachev's call for nuclear-free and demilitarized zones in the east resulted from increased American and NATO exercise activity in the 1980s, in seas close to the Soviet Union. Ligachev, during a 1986 visit to Finland, called for Soviet ballistic missile submarines be removed from the Baltic in exchange for a NATO agreement on a nuclear-free north Europe and curtailment or elimination of large-scale naval exercises from the North, Norwegian, Barents and Baltic Seas.⁹⁸ An interpretation of Lev Yudovich is that "the Soviets mean a combination of military, ideological, psychological, economic, diplomatic, and other kinds of war against Western Europe and the United States."⁹⁹ Warsaw Pact

⁹⁷Michael R. Gordon, "Soviets Scale Back Naval Deployments And Large Exercises" New York Times July 17, 1988, p. 1.

⁹⁸David Alan Rosenberg, "It is Hardly Possible to Imagine Anything Worse": Soviet Thoughts on the Maritime Strategy", Naval War College Review, Summer 1988, p. 82.

⁹⁹Yudovich, p. 39.

leadership in the spring of 1987 furthered the "zone of peace" initiative with the adoption of The New Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Pact States. Emphasizing more than just Pact solidarity, this new doctrine incorporated an array of proposals for arms reduction, negotiations and crisis controls between East and West. Its principal goal was the creation of zones of peace in various regions of Europe and other parts of the world free from nuclear and chemical weapons with zones of reduced concentration of armaments and increased trust. The implementation of military confidence-building measures in Europe on a mutual basis was advocated as well as the attainment of accords on such measures in other areas of the world as well as on the seas and oceans.¹⁰⁰ Maritime strategy has produced a serious counter-initiative in the form of the Soviet proposal regarding "zones of peace". Moscow believes that the current posture of the American Navy poses a potential threat to the achievement of its objectives should war occur. To counter this threat, Moscow proposes,

"The zones-of-peace concept, while contributing to Gorbachev's multifaceted foreign policy efforts aimed at projecting the image of the Soviet Union as the chief architect of peace in the 1980s and 1990s, would also, if agreed to by the West, virtually eliminate the U.S. Navy's program of joint and combined exercises. By denying the United States the opportunity to practice the operations envisaged in the Maritime Strategy, the Soviet Union could seriously impair Western capability to conduct those operations under difficult wartime conditions."¹⁰¹

¹⁰⁰Rosenberg, p. 82.

¹⁰¹Ibid, p. 101.

These Soviet overtures are more than just propaganda and constitute a serious response to the challenge laid down by the American initiative. This type of response is a most significant Soviet commentary on maritime strategy.

Dominating Soviet strategy is national military doctrine, 'a system of views adopted in a state for a given period of time on the objectives and character of a possible war, on the preparation of the country and the armed forces for war, and on the methods of waging war.'¹⁰² The political goal of Gorbachev is the elimination of all nuclear weapons worldwide. However logical inconsistencies exist in this declaration. The Soviet Union claims its military doctrine to be "uniquely defensive."¹⁰³ Moscow is well aware of the fact that if it can convince the rest of the world, most particularly its immediate neighbors and allies to disarm nuclear-wise, Soviet success in a potential NATO-WTO conflict can be greatly enhanced. "The USSR and its armed forces possess sufficient military and combat potential despite the fact that this

¹⁰²Ibid., p. 98.

¹⁰³The USSR has pledged not to use nuclear weapons first, and it will adhere to it in the strictest fashion. But it is no secret that scenarios in which we (the Soviet Union) are subjected to nuclear attack exist. We (the Soviet Union) have no right not to take them into account." Lenin, V. I., "Poln.sobr.soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 36, p. 396 as quoted in "The Evolution of Military Art: Stages, Tendencies, Principles JPRS-UMA-89-012-L, 12 October 1989, p. 1.

requires spending money which could be used for the good of man, for the purposes of creation."¹⁰⁴

Subordinate to military strategy is operational art which incorporates the theory and practice of conducting joint and independent operations. As naval exercises reflect military art, it has been postulated that recent Soviet naval exercise patterns, particularly since 1985 (the year Gorbachev came to power as the newest Soviet Secretary General) reflect a revision in Soviet military strategy. The trend reveals the exertion of Soviet pressure upon the NATO Nordic allies to favorably influence a US response to Soviet arms control reductions proposals, but does not indicate a revision in Soviet military theory. "We (Soviets) are realists, and we cannot ignore the fact that the ruling circles of imperialist countries stand on different positions incompatible with the peace-loving goals of the UCSR's foreign policy."¹⁰⁵

Diminished is the role of the surface ship and emphasized is the strategic role of the Soviet submarine force in defense of the Soviet homeland. This is not a revision of Soviet military theory,

"Soviet military doctrine has not changed. Rather, the changes are in the military-technical aspect of military doctrine. The military-technical aspect of the new Soviet military doctrine is defensive in nature, which has caused some disquiet and consternation among the professional military who have matured in a military system that

¹⁰⁴"The Evolution of Military Art: Stages, Tendencies, Principles" JPRS-UMA-89-012-L, 12 October 1989, p. 115.

¹⁰⁵Ibid.

traditionally stressed the offensive nature of military arms."¹⁰⁶

Moscow has always stressed defensive and offensive strategy and the Soviets will call upon both offensive and defensive forces in a NATO/Warsaw Pact conflict. Obviously, conventional warfare will be used first in an with the hopes of ending the conflict on the conventional plane. The use of nuclear weaponry would destroy Western European territory and its industrialized regions, which the Kremlin so desperately covets as the potential victor in such a clash. But the Soviets have not ruled out the use of nuclear forces in a just war or in defense of the Socialist homeland, "...the Soviet Union intends, as before, to increase its fighting capabilities so that it can conduct wars and can prepare the country 'for armed defense using not only nuclear arms but also conventional weapons with very effective means of destruction.'"¹⁰⁷

Moscow is well aware that the Warsaw Pact is operating from a position of inferiority in the North against NATO,

"NATO countries exceed the Warsaw Treaty countries in the strength of naval personnel by 4.5 times, the number of ocean-going ships 7.6 times, and the gross tonnage of ships 3 times. The U.S. 'new sea strategy' presupposes establishment of control over all areas of the world ocean. Ocean-going ships make up 65 percent in the ship composition of the U.S. Navy, and ships of coastal operation, 6 per cent...the Soviet Navy, apart from submarines with ballistic missiles which are subject to talks on cutting strategic weapons, is assigned for the defence of Soviet coast. 52 per cent of warships are

¹⁰⁶Lev Yudovich, "Warsaw Pact's New Military Doctrine: More Velvet Glove, Less Iron Fist" Armed Forces Journal International, February, 1988, p. 38.

¹⁰⁷Ibid., p. 38.

vessels of coastal operation and only 12 per cent are ocean-going ships."¹⁰⁸

Furthermore, "failure is evident in a military that now consumes at least 15-20 percent of the nation's product but cannot prevent a Cessna 172 from landing in Red Square, and allows Afghan rebels to defeat the mighty Red Army."¹⁰⁹

Soviet national goals, William Manthorpe says in his article "What Is Pushing Gorbachev Into Arms Control", can still be inferred to include defense of the Russian homeland and the Soviet state and the maintenance of dominance over the land and sea areas adjacent to Soviet borders.¹¹⁰ The goal of strengthening the Soviet system is as important as strengthening the Soviet state, but defense of the Soviet homeland is still paramount. Manthorpe further points out that the inherent character of the Soviet Union as a garrison state precludes a change in the Soviet perspective in response to a changing world environment, "the Soviets do not intend to change their underlying mind set, national goals, or fundamental approach to implementing national strategy...All they need to do is to change the primary method of implementing their strategy."¹¹¹ Gorbachev realizes though that the garrison state can

¹⁰⁸"Baltic Fleet Exercises Held 6-8 Sep" LD0909140288 Moscow Tass, 9 September 1988, FBIS-SOV-88-176, 12 September 1988, p. 70.

¹⁰⁹Allison, p. 20.

¹¹⁰Captain William H. J. Manthorpe, USN, Ret., "What Is Pushing Gorbachev Into Arms Control?" Proceedings, December 1988, p. 39.

¹¹¹Ibid.

not survive on massive military strength alone. The Soviet system can only be strengthened through restructuring of the political and economic bureaucracy and reconstruction of the national economy.

"Internal reductions are needed as well. Only by reaching agreements on arms reduction and confidence-building measures can Gorbachev convince the Soviet military leaders to move their services toward adopting a defensive doctrine."¹¹²

The wartime role of the Soviet Navy has been to keep American warships from approaching Soviet territory and the protection of Soviet missile-firing submarines deployed close to the Soviet Union. The establishment of a Nordic NWFZ would accomplish this goal. It is highly questionable if the character of Soviet defense has undergone such a drastic revision. Seen is a more aggressive application of the defensive strategy incorporating both defensive measures close to Soviet soil. Naval operations conducted close to the Soviet mainland is a departure from pre-1986 exercises. Heightened NATO response in the Northern Flank is the result of recent developments there. "...two recently confirmed developments in the Soviet Northern Fleet, based in the Kola peninsula region. Four Typhoon-class strategic submarines are now based just 40 km (50 km is a more accurate figure) from the Norwegian border and aging Yankee-class strategic subs are now being refitted to carry new SSN-21 'smart' cruise missiles. The Typhoon base is in Guba Zapadnaya Litsa fjord."¹¹³ Norway frequently complains about this.

¹¹²Ibid.

¹¹³Rolf Soderlind, "Soviet Sub Developments Prompt Call for More NATO Northern Exercises" Armed Forces Journal International, March 1988, p. 32.

Moscow cites its "changed" naval exercise pattern as a "new practical step in the history of the activity in military fleets."¹¹⁴ Admiral Ivanov, Commander of the Baltic Fleet states

"Our country has not only advanced the concept of new political thinking but also begun implementing this itself, including broader glasnost in the sphere of military activity. Of course, comparable steps by NATO would serve as evidence of greater mutual understanding."¹¹⁵

Soviet analysis has correctly identified changes in American geo-political interests as well as options for naval operations in the event of war. There exists a certain sense of urgency on the need to respond to the operational challenges posed by the maritime strategy. "According to many Western Sovietologists, external expansion served an essential ideological role in justifying the Soviet regime at home."¹¹⁶ But too many people are too quick to applaud Soviet "revisionism" without carefully examining the facts, particularly how they equate to historical trends. The Soviet Union is foremost a land-based power and as such, defense of its homeland and its self-professed "common European homeland" shared by Western Europeans is paramount. Expulsion of the United States from the European continent and enforced political domination of the Eurasian land mass by the Soviet Union is still the key objective in a Warsaw Pact/NATO conflict. The United States must

¹¹⁴"Paper Describes Exercise" PM1209090788 Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda 9 Sep 1988, FBIS-SOV-88-176, 12 September 1988, p. 72.

¹¹⁵Ibid.

¹¹⁶Allison, p. 61.

never forget this long term objective of the Kremlin. Moscow will further the objective at whatever the cost and via whatever avenue available.

"Gorbachev's main purpose is to guarantee and enhance the Soviet Union's position as a great power. To that end, he seeks breathing space, *peredyshka*. His words and deeds, attempt to cope with competing challenges: to secure his position in the struggle for power at home; to provide a framework that will allow him to shift resources from defense to more productive investments; and to maintain a posture plausible enough to allow him to constrain Western arms through arms control."¹¹⁷

Soviet literature has begun to downplay the emphasis on sea-based nuclear weapons which has dominated their characterization of the role of the US Navy in the 1970s. "The nuclear correlations of forces remains critical in Soviet thinking about general war, but renewed emphasis has also been placed on the traditional sea-control role of the Western naval forces."¹¹⁸ David Alan Rosenberg in his article "It is Hardly Possible to Imagine Anything Worse": Soviet Thoughts on the Maritime Strategy" concludes that the formulations of the maritime strategy although not given full credence as military theory are contributing in to the reevaluation present in the Soviet Union today regarding the role of nuclear weapons in national strategy and the possible course of a future war.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁷Ibid.

¹¹⁸Rosenberg, p. 101.

¹¹⁹Ibid.

Senior American military officials believe that the cutback in Soviet naval exercises reflects budgetary restraints and does not portend an important change in Soviet military doctrine. One must remember, when interpreting claims that Soviet military doctrine has not undergone a revision, that **the basic requirement of Soviet military doctrine remains and that is - defeat of the West in a clash involving defense of the Socialist homeland.** This has not changed. General John R. Galvin, USA, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) states,

"The key to it in terms of Western security is to look at the Soviet military organization and see what actual changes take place. So far there have not been any - except that they get better every year."¹²⁰

Indications are that Soviet power projection has been diminished in priority accompanied by a limiting of size of new military programs. Disappeared is the reference to the liberating mission of the Soviet military. The Soviet military has adopted a type of cost-benefit analysis. Present is a genuine need to make foreign policy less expensive for the Soviet Union and this extends to naval exercises. Naval exercises, particularly those involving surface combatants, are visible signs of military force. Such exercises are often touted by politicians and legislators as the first visible sign of a genuine intent in the reduction of arms and defense spending. The Kremlin is attempting to become more "Westernized", employing this same rationale in an effort to beat

¹²⁰Henrywan Loon, "An exclusive AFJI interview with: General John R. Galvin, USA, Supreme Allied Commander Europe" Armed Forces Journal International, March 1988, p. 52.

the United States at her own game. Moscow is using the issue of arms control through surface naval exercises to reduce defense cutbacks to an East-West contest. The Kremlin is out to prove that it is to be the master of its destiny, either passively or actively in the East-West contest. If it can influence NATO Europe or part of the coalition, it will do so to achieve its goal.

Moscow is exhibiting a heightened emphasis upon the political tools for the achievement of its foreign policy objectives such as the resolution of arms control reductions between the East and the West. Manifested as a contest between the two super powers, author Lev Yudovich sees the Soviet Union as,

"...a superpower having strategic parity with the United States while at the same time conducting a policy that pursues the use of political measures rather than armed force to secure their goals. The Soviets, however, do not intend to abandon the threat of armed forces; instead they plan to use political measures as the means of first resort in pursuit of their foreign policy objectives."¹²¹

This thesis opened with a discussion of military and political tools uses in the resolution of arms control issues. The Nordic NWFZ proposal is considered a military and political tool used by the Soviets in the realization of its foreign policy objectives. Naval exercises are tools used in the exercise of Soviet military and political persuasion upon the North.

The fact that the exercises employing large Soviet naval surface forces have been curtailed in an effort to economize domestically can not be ignored. But the underlying force behind

¹²¹Yudovich, p. 38.

the reduction of Soviet naval exercises is the conviction that the Kremlin can bolster its image as a "peace loving nation" committed to arms reductions between the two superpowers and their allies. Naval exercises can be interpreted as very visible displays of power projection when conducted on the grand scale of Soviet naval exercises of the past. Soviet naval exercises have been constricted as a play to world and more particularly NATO public opinion. The reduction of exercises coupled with the appropriate publicity provides the citizenry of NATO Europe with immediate testimony of the Soviet pledge to arms reduction and draws attention, acutely to the continuance of United States naval exercises in the same region and by inference, the lack of commitment to arms reduction by the "aggressive imperialistic American war mongers."

The reduction of Soviet surface combatant naval exercises in the Northern Flank corresponds with the appointment of Mikhail Gorbachev as the Soviet Secretary General in 1985. It is too soon to determine if this is merely coincidental. With him came a revolution in Soviet foreign policy. "New thinking" was advocated and Gorbachev was out to prove that past assumptions and generalizations regarding the Soviet Union were no longer valid. Glasnost of Soviet foreign policy has been accompanied by a linkage of key international issues such as arms control and the resolution of regional conflicts with issues designed to dethrone the United States as the supreme superpower and bolster the superpower status of the Soviet Union, domestically and internationally. Paramount

is the notion that Soviet foreign policy will no longer be viewed through the prism of the United States. Soviet considerations will equally be weighed.

David Alan Rosenberg states,

"The trend in Soviet naval activities, with a decline in deployment levels out of area, tactical exercises conducted closer to home waters, and reduction in submarine excursions is an enigma which has not been convincingly explained. An operational concept based on forming defensive rings around strategic submarines, and deployments closer to the Soviet homeland - the Bastion theory - may be an explanation."¹²²

Like all statistics, the statistics regarding Soviet naval exercise patterns since Gorbachev can be fashioned to support whatever thesis, the analyst is striving to prove. The trends may or may not be indicative of a changed military philosophy for the Soviet Navy. The trend may only be temporary and coincidentally correspond with appointment of Gorbachev as Secretary General. He has only been in office for a short period and many Sovietologists are too quick to label Gorbachev and Soviet policies as revisionary. Such a stance discounts the basic premise of Communism and hence the foundation of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union will never conform to the Imperialism as is suggested by revisionism. The Soviets are giving the impression of a "peace loving nation" as they define "peace loving" to the point that it benefits their goals and objectives.

One must also study the capabilities of the Soviet navy not what the Soviets would like for us to believe. A country cannot

¹²²"Soviet naval trends remain 'an enigma'" Jane's Defence Weekly 28 May 1988, p. 1046.

be judged by what its leaders say without judging the capabilities of that country. This analysis of Soviet capabilities does not support the Soviet claims. The Soviet navy despite Soviet rhetoric still has and maintains an offensive capability.

Naval exercises, especially those involving surface naval combatants provide a very attractive avenue for the Kremlin's declarations of its commitment to arms reductions and consequently the reduction of East-West tension. Moscow is willing to play whatever game is necessary in the achievement of its objectives and if a reduced naval presence does not prove to be the key, Moscow will opt for another angle. Marshal Akhromeyev, in September stated "Moscow would place a high priority in future arms control negotiations on reducing naval forces and sharply limiting their activities...proposals to NATO include:

- Restructuring missile-carrying submarines to certain areas of the ocean that would in turn be closed to specialized anti-submarine warfare vessels,
- Prohibition of missile-carrying surface ships of one country from approaching another's coast within the range of the ship's missiles,
- Prohibitions on naval activities in agreed international sea lanes, straits, shipping areas and fishing zones,
- Prohibition of the deployment of amphibious craft and landing forces within reach of the other's coast to prevent surprise attacks,
- Notice of large-scale naval maneuvers with the participation of foreign observers, much as NATO and Warsaw Pact countries now do with ground maneuvers; limits on the size and number

of major naval maneuvers and perhaps inspection of each other's ships and shore facilities."¹²³

Gorbachev may be trying to prove to the world that the Soviet Union can deal with the West in a responsible manner and earlier exercises could have been considered too provocative. But the deployment of American sea-launched cruise missiles could prompt the Soviet Union to place additional emphasis once again on developing the ability to engage Western units far from Soviet territory or it could reinforce the need for bastions.

"The West is being called to work together with the Soviet Union. It is for the West to decide what kind of a Soviet Union it wishes to have: a garrison state which staggers from one crisis to the next or an economically and politically viable nation in which irreversible change is taking place."¹²⁴

Reformation of Soviet foreign policy is based on two assumptions. "It proposes to view the world as a whole and to accept the fact that security can no longer be maintained by military means alone but only by means of 'common security between East and West and in the international arena'".¹²⁵ The Soviet Union has accepted the views of Clausewitz and Lenin that military means must be subordinated to political means, if the goal of military-strategic balance is to be attained. The Kremlin exhibits "a willingness to

¹²³Michael Parks, "Soviets Propose Reducing Risks of Naval Clash" Los Angeles Times September 6, 1988.

¹²⁴"Hints Of Major Shifts In Pact Doctrine, Organization" Frankfurt/Main Frankfurter Allgemeine 4 Jul 87, FBIS-SOV-87-136, 16 Jul 87, p. CC 5.

¹²⁵Ibid.

experiment with alternative ways of achieving a goal."¹²⁶ A substantial relaxation of competition with the United States in the international arena is advocated. "Just as economic determinants are finally imposing constraints that should make the Soviet Union a less formidable military adversary, Gorbachev has already made the Soviet Union a more daunting competitor."¹²⁷

Budgetary constraints coupled with increased emphasis by Soviet planners upon the improvement of the navy's capability to conduct operations close to home is a factor. But increased has been the use of the navy in conjunction with air force units to improve the Soviet ability to defend itself against attack by bombers and cruise missiles. Near-term budgetary constraints is the frequent explanation and justification for the change in Gorbachev's efforts to modernize the Soviet industry.

¹²⁶Graham T. Allison, Jr., "Testing Gorbachev." Foreign Affairs. (December 1988), p. 20.

¹²⁷Ibid, p. 18.

VI. NORDIC MILITARY-POLITICAL SITUATION

A. THE AVOIDANCE OF APPEARING PROVOCATIVE: INSURANCE OR SUICIDE FOR THE REGION

Changes in global balance of power and alliance relationships may be forcing a shift in Western security policy. US Secretary of State George P. Shultz cited the "...emerging features of global change as - the rapidity both of technological innovation and the means to distribute that technology on a global scale,...increasing economic interdependence and ...the dispersion of political power."¹²⁸ Authors Taylor and Cole state that "each Nordic nation is adjusting in its own way to changes in the regional and global security environment."¹²⁹

The Northern Flank countries of NATO (Denmark, Iceland and Norway) have a history of political stability and cohesiveness. Northern flank countries' Soviet threat perceptions have long been in decline except at the elite and expert levels, yet Denmark and

¹²⁸"U.S.-Soviet Relations in a Changing World, Managing the Relationship" By George P. Shultz, U.S. Secretary of State, Delivered before the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington, February 5, 1988, Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. LIV, No. 11, March 15, 1988, p. 322.

¹²⁹William J. Taylor, Jr. and Paul M. Cole, ed., Nordic Defense: Comparative Decision Making, (Lexington, Mass. and Toronto: D.C. Heath and Company and Lexington Book, 1985), p. 188.

Norway have long been considered key penetration points in a potential NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict.

The term "equidistance" characterizes the attitude of many people, particularly in the successor generations, in the European nations and provides insight as to how some people in these nations view themselves. Many people in these nations see themselves as equally distant from each superpower. This perception greatly discounts the East-West struggle. The United States is viewed as driving the East-West struggle. "Equidistancing" undermines the basis of the Alliance as it omits its basic deterrent function by discounting the threat.

Paralleling the attitude of "equidistancing" is the fear of appearing too provocative to the Soviet Union. The Nordic nations understand the need to maintain good relations with the USSR. The highest priority is given to avoid antagonizing the "Big Bear". Thomas Ries in "Soviet Military Strategy and Northern Waters" says that,

"...the political dimension of (NATO Nordic) security policy, (incorporates) the equally vital need not to raise regional tensions vis-a-vis the USSR more than necessary. This dilemma may continue as the NATO Nordic states have to choose between maintaining either their military deterrent credibility or regional good relations with the USSR."¹³⁰

"During the past decade...the Scandinavians have been subjected to a barrage of Soviet political and military actions designed to harass or frighten them, generate a sense of

¹³⁰ Tomas Ries, "Soviet Military Strategy and Northern Waters", The Soviet Union and Northern Waters, Edited by Clive Archer. (London and New York: Routledge, 1988) p. 131.

separateness from the Western Alliance, and condition them to accept a posture of compliant, pro-Soviet neutrality."¹³¹ Past Soviet military pressure in the North has not been altogether ineffective. Ineffective by whose determination is the issue. It has been ineffective for the Soviet Union and counterproductive for it has pushed the Nordic members of the Alliance closer to NATO and subsequently strengthening NATO in the North. "Soviet military presence in the far north has evidenced the response of a greater military effort in the region by Norway, Iceland, Denmark and their allies. It has hardened public opinion to support NATO and remain skeptical of the USSR."¹³²

"The line dividing the two military-political blocs passes through Europe."¹³³ Advocated by the Soviet Union is "...a system that would heal the military division on a basis of cooperation and good-neighbourhood (sic) among all European states. Precisely such a security system is implied by the ever more popular concept of a 'common European home'."¹³⁴ But the Soviet Union and the Nordic nations have very different ideas as to what "a common European

¹³¹Francis J. West Jr., Jacquelyn K. Davis, James E. Dougherty, Robert J. Hanks and Charles M. Perry, Naval Forces and Western Security, Special Report 1987, The Atlantic and Western Security: The Maritime Dimension, Volume 1, p. 28.

¹³²Thomas Ries, p. 174.

¹³³"Soviet Diplomacy Turns to Europe," The Current Digest Of The Soviet Press, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 29., p. 8.

¹³⁴Sergei Karaganov, "The Common European Home: The Military Angle" International Affairs, August 1988, p. 71.

home" would mean. Both interpretations are correlations of the changing global balance of power, Secretary Shultz discusses above.

In the North a common security challenge confronts and in some measure requires a common response from three NATO and two neutral countries. In addition, the problem in the North has grown considerably in recent years with the steady build up of Soviet military capabilities in the Kola Peninsula and nearby areas. Complicating the problem is the perceived enhancement to both sides of the Norwegian and Barents Seas in any conflict, and the more aggressive actions of the Soviets in probing Norwegian and Swedish waters.

These nations are economically sound and have enjoyed a relatively high standard of living. The North has enjoyed a peaceful, almost quiet existence with "...the North region (having) always been a separate and distinct part of Europe."¹³⁵ Soviet proponents state that,

The West is being called upon to work together with the Soviet Union. It is for the West to decide what kind of a Soviet Union it wishes to have: a garrison state which staggers from one crisis to the next or an economically and politically viable nation in which irreversible change is taking place."¹³⁶

The Nordic definition is underscored by the fear of appearing too provocative to the Soviet Union, its neighboring superpower.

"The Danish and Norwegian governments rely on military preparedness to deter the Soviets, yet take measures to demonstrate peaceful intent and nonprovocation. The purpose

¹³⁵Taylor, Cole, p. 191.

¹³⁶"Hints Of Major Shifts In Pact Doctrine, Organization", Frankfurt/Main Frankfurter Allegemeine, in German, 4 Jul 87, p. 5, FBIS-SOV 16 Jul 87, p. CC 5.

of this approach is to create stability and peace at the lowest possible level of military preparedness and reduce political tension in northern Europe."¹³⁷

Moscow and Washington view this as contradictory and want the Nordic nations to take a more assertive stance in the demonstration of their support for the East or the West. If the Nordic nations continue to be reluctant to make a definitive stance against one of the superpowers, the United States will seek to maintain the status quo in the region for current Nordic sentiment favors the West. The Soviet Union would obviously favor a Nordic preference for the East. "The Soviet Union is not a status quo power - and cannot be so according to its own image of itself. For the ruling class of the nomenklatura international politics as all other politics, consists of a perpetual struggle."¹³⁸

Arne Brundtland argues that the Nordic reluctance is tied to the Nordic perception of the use of military force in resolving a political situation. Brundtland states,

"The security challenge to the five Nordic states does not emanate from within the region. The use of military force to solve political problems among the Nordic states is nearly inconceivable. The prime security problems of the Nordic countries result from the differences between the East and the West and the Nordic region's strategic importance in this struggle."¹³⁹

¹³⁷Arne Brundtland, "The Context of Security in Northern Europe" Northern Europe: Security Issues for the 1990's. Edited by Paul M. Cole and Douglas M. Hart, (Boulder and London: Westview Press and CSIS, Georgetown University, 1986), pp. 10-11.

¹³⁸Bent Jensen, "The Soviet Union And Scandinavia: Status Quo Or Revision - 'Nordic Balance' Or 'Nordic Peace Zone'?" Nordic Journal of Scandinavian Affairs, Volume 4:1 (1987), p. 9.

¹³⁹Brundtland, p. 11.

One cannot fault the Nordic nations for their diffidence in dealing with the superpowers for it is likely that should conflict ensue between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, it is likely to be fought on Nordic soil. When studying the Nordic NWFZ proposal one must remember that,

"...the greatest nuclear presence in Northern Europe can be found at the Soviet bases on the Kola peninsula, though primarily strategic and not specifically directed against the Nordic countries. Nevertheless, these countries (Nordic nations) feel uncomfortable about having the weapons on their doorstep, especially when military resources used to defend Soviet strategic weapons can be used against their territory."¹⁴⁰

This fact can not but alter Scandinavia's perceptions of the zone. It is probably the single most important factor affecting Nordic interpretation. The Nordic nations are at disadvantage when dealing with the Soviet Union due to implicit differences of the two societies; the Nordic nations are open societies whereas the Soviet Union is a closed society. As such, the Soviets do not practice open communication and dialogue with the Nordic countries in military matters. "The Soviet policy of concealment is counterproductive, as it adds to the perception of Soviet expansionism and Nordic vulnerability."¹⁴¹

Nordic leaders point out that shared security goals equate to shared perceptions. "The Nordic balance is best conceptualized as a carefully orchestrated zone within which the inherent tensions

¹⁴⁰Clive Archer, "Russia's Arctic Dimension" World Today, vol. 44, no. 3, March, 1988, pp. 47-48.

¹⁴¹Brundtland, p. 11.

born out of mutual superpower hostilities and capabilities are to be accentuated."¹⁴² These leaders want a voice in security decisions regarding their nations and do not want to be pawns between the superpowers. Nordic security perceptions are not "mirror images" of the superpowers nor will the Nordic leaders allow them to be. The North leaders seek more than "buffer zone status" for their nations.

The Soviet Union has not altered its perception of Nordic security policies and the "Nordic balance,"

"...the fundamental view taken of the security policies of the Nordic countries is still the same today under Gorbachev as it was just short of forty years ago under Stalin as well as under Chrushev (sic) and Breznev (sic). Under pressure from 'the forces of imperialism', by mistake or misjudgement (sic), some of the Nordic countries have ended up in the aggressive NATO bloc, while Sweden chose a West-oriented and therefore not quite correct policy of neutrality. Only Finland chose the right course. And this regrettable state of affairs in Scandinavia must be altered the sooner the better."¹⁴³

It would then appear that Moscow has not regarded Denmark's, Iceland's and Norway's membership in NATO as a stabilizing factor in the Nordic pattern of security policy. "None of the Soviet leaders since the late 1940s have ever accepted the 'Nordic balance but have constantly pressed for the creation of a 'permanent peace zone.'"¹⁴⁴ Finland is the only Nordic country which is regarded - under the present circumstances - as having an acceptable status

¹⁴²Taylor, Cole, p. xx.

¹⁴³Bent Jensen, p. 11.

¹⁴⁴Ibid., p. 11.

vis-a-vis the Soviet Union."¹⁴⁵ Finland is bound by a "friendship treaty" with the Soviet Union and consequently has been reduced to a neutralized status.

Soviet writers, such as Sergei Karaganov contend that the "balance of forces" has already shifted in favor of the Soviet Union. He states that,

"In view of most West European leaders, the balance of forces in Europe has shifted in favour (sic) of the Soviet Union. They tend to judge us (the Soviets) by their own standard, or rather, that of the United States, which is prone to make high-handed use of a favourable (sic) balance of forces in this or that region for putting pressure or even aggression (in the 1980s, for instance, there was Lebanon, Libya, Nicaragua, Grenada). Hence the conclusion: in order to prevent the USSR from acting in a similar way, one should somehow compensate for the shift in the balance of power in its favour (sic)."¹⁴⁶

Mr. Karaganov is correct in his assessment of Western mirror-imaging but for him to conclude that the majority of Western European leaders realize that the "balance of forces" has shifted in favor of the Soviet Union is inaccurate.

R. Ekeus in his paper "How to proceed towards a Nordic nuclear weapon-free zone" cites as a prerequisite,

"The three essential components in the process of establishing a nuclear weapon-free zone are: (a) a positive decision (i.e., will) in each of the countries concerned; (b) tentative agreement between the countries; and (c) accommodation of the nuclear weapon powers, (primarily the two great powers)."¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁵Ibid.

¹⁴⁶Karaganov, p. 76.

¹⁴⁷R. Ekeus, "How to proceed towards a Nordic nuclear weapon-free zone" in Nuclear Disengagement in Europe, edited by Sverre Lodgaard and Marek Thee, (London and New York: Taylor & Francis, 1983), p. 239.

But not all Nordic nations are in agreement regarding the prerequisites or objectives of a Nordic NWFZ. Nordic perceptions of a NWFZ are products of the political climates of the individual Nordic nations. Each nation seeks the enhancement of its own national security interests. Nordic national security is not a collective effort but one that does however require a common vision amongst the Nordic nations,

"Denmark has always had a dual foreign policy orientation: toward the Nordic states, a region in which Denmark was often the dominant power; and toward the continental European states with which Denmark, in the past, formed various alliances. Norway has had a dual orientation toward the Nordic states on the one hand and toward the sea or, more specifically, toward Great Britain and other dominant sea powers on the other hand. Iceland is distantly located and its national interests have always been defined by its dominant industry, fisheries. Finland has had a dual orientation as well. Although the Finns share the same fundamental values and traditions of Scandinavia in general....(and) Sweden's convenient geographic location partly accounts for its monistic foreign policy since the time of Napoleon..."¹⁴⁸

As previously stated, the Nordic nations do not want to be pawns between the superpowers, but this is contradicted when one considers that "The dominant problem is obviously the great powers' attitude. If an emphatically negative stand is taken by one of the great powers, the zone project is doomed to failure."¹⁴⁹ The United States and NATO must tactfully guide Scandinavia in order for the United States to retain its nuclear superiority in the region. But to be successful, US and NATO leaders must encourage

¹⁴⁸Taylor, Cole, p. 190.

¹⁴⁹R. Ekeus, p. 239.

Scandinavian leaders in a manner that will allow these leaders to accept credit for retention of the American nuclear guarantee. Scandinavia does not want to be a pawn for either superpower and too much persuasion on the part of either superpower would be enough to dissuade Scandinavia.

Nordic nations consider maintenance of the status quo essential for a 'common European home.' The irony is that a nation that "straddles the fence" cannot hope for real autonomy in its national security affairs. Such a nation can only be seen as a potential player in a superpower conflict and nothing more than a pawn. This is specifically what the Nordic nations do not want. But until the Nordic nations take a definite stand on the NWFZ issue, Scandinavia will be nothing more than a "Northern pawn" in the eyes of the superpowers.

Scandinavian national security or preservation of a way of life acceptable to the people of Scandinavia is paramount. It should be compatible with the needs and legitimate aspirations of others. It includes freedom from attack or coercion, freedom from internal subversion and freedom from erosion of the political, economic and social values which are essential to the quality of life in Scandinavia. A Nordic NWFZ would circumvent the Scandinavian national security interests mentioned above, leaving Scandinavia with little say in their national security.

VII. DIFFERENCES IN WESTERN INTERPRETATIONS FOR A NORDIC NWFZ

Despite Soviet advocacy for the establishment of a Nordic NWFZ there lacks a concrete definition by the Kremlin on what said zone would mean for the Soviet Union. The Soviet proposal does not address the crucial questions of: inclusion of Soviet territory in a Nordic zone; nuclear weapons targeted on the region from outside the zone; verifiability; or how geographic asymmetries and existing security arrangements would be taken into account in such a zone. "It has never been explicitly stated what the Soviets would be willing to offer in return for a Nordic nuclear free zone except a statement by Leonid Brezhnev in 1981 that the Soviet Union would be willing 'to undertake certain measures' on its own territory."¹⁵⁰ However, the Nordic nations have their own interpretations of what a Nordic NWFZ would mean for them. Their definition is not so ambiguous.

As previously stated, other Scandinavian nations do not have nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union wants a commitment to no nuclear weapons in the future. The principal Nordic nations of Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland "...already have no nuclear weapons on their territory and, as signatories to the Nonproliferation Treaty, have foregone their right to develop and deploy such weapons...

¹⁵⁰Niels Haagerup, "Scandinavian NATO Without Nuclear Weapons" The Washington Quarterly, Winter 1986, p. 11.

(the Kremlin seeks to) confirm this de facto nuclear-free situation by formal arrangement."¹⁵¹

Soviet military doctrine professes a strictly defensive character. The Kremlin supports this. "There is general agreement in Moscow that the defensive nature of Soviet military-political goals is demonstrated by the USSR's willingness both to prevent war between the East and the West and to defend the Socialist community against Aggression should war break out."¹⁵² Gorbachev's response to the West regarding such "conjectures from abroad"¹⁵³ follows,

"I state in no uncertain terms: We are not doing and will not do anything over and above what meets the minimum requirements of our defense and the protection of our friends and allies, especially in view of American military activities not far from our own and their borders."¹⁵⁴ (Emphasis added)

It is apparent that "...this defensive orientation does not imply the kind of military restraint that Western countries are hoping for. It is continually emphasized that the USSR must strengthen its military capabilities and that the defense of Socialist

¹⁵¹ Richard Bitzinger, "Nordic Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zones: Prospects and Problems" Rand P-7356, August 1987, p. 1.

¹⁵² Gerhard Wettig, "Has Soviet Military Doctrine Changed?" Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty RL465/87, November 20, 1987, p. 2.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Delivered at the Presentation of the Order of Lenin, Vladivostok, USSR, July 28, 1986, "Gorbachev Accents Soviet Role in Asia" The Current Digest Of The Soviet Press, Volume XXXVIII, No. 30, August 27, 1986, p. 4.

achievements against the encroachments of imperialism can only be guaranteed by a high level of military preparedness."¹⁵⁵

A. US REACTION AND COMMENTARY

"The Soviet Union's pledge (of 15 June 1982) that Moscow won't be the first to use nuclear weapons was dismissed by Reagan administration officials as propaganda aimed at wooing Western Europe."¹⁵⁶ If this is true, wouldn't the Nordic NWFZ as envisioned by the Soviets be another propaganda attempt to woo Western Europe?

Moscow continually portrays the United States as the obstacle to the establishment of NWFZs. The United States has expressly opposed the zone, reasoning that it would complicate arms control negotiations and damage NATO cooperation. But the United States supports the creation of NWFZs that are workable, that realistically take into account existing security arrangements, and that truly enhance the security of a region. Sovietologists state that "in contrast to the USSR, the USA has taken great care in dealing with the nuclear issue."¹⁵⁷ This is surprising because research has shown that the US response regarding the Nordic NWFZ, until recently, to be nebulous, a feature that the Soviets will no

¹⁵⁵Wettig, p. 2.

¹⁵⁶Karen Elliott House, "Soviet Pledge on Atomic Bomb Use Dismissed by U.S. as a Propaganda Ploy," Wall Street Journal, 16 June 1982, p. 2.

¹⁵⁷Nigel de Lee, "Iceland: Unarmed Ally" Northern Waters: Security and Resource Issues. Edited by Clive Archer and David Schrivener. (London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1986), p. 199.

doubt use to their advantage.¹⁵⁸ As stated earlier, the Soviet proposal fails to address the crucial issues of a Nordic NWFZ. Since these issues have not been addressed by the Soviets, it is unlikely that they will be issues of compromise for the Soviets. "The Soviet have years of experience with deception programs related to arms control agreements."¹⁵⁹

Even in the face of this Soviet challenge, "The three chief tenets of NATO have never been in doubt: a common purpose, a common strategy and a common defense."¹⁶⁰ Oliver Wright, Former Ambassador of Great Britain to the United States, stated:

"Europe remains of central importance to America because this where the adversary superpower is present in its greatest strength. Europe is where Russia is. And Western Europe is where there is the greatest concentration of freedom-loving people outside the United States, over 300 million."¹⁶¹

His statement puts in basic terms the need for continued American military presence in the region in both conventional and nuclear terms. Even if the cultural tie is discounted, the Soviets are there, the region is critical to US interests. "The line dividing

¹⁵⁸President Bush specifically rejected NWFZs in December, 1989.

¹⁵⁹Professor Kerry M. Kartchner, Soviet Compliance With A Future START Agreement, Working Papers in International Studies, I-89-9, The Hoover Institution, Stanford University, March 1989, p. 35.

¹⁶⁰Bertram, p. 943.

¹⁶¹"Current Challenges to the Special Relationship: U.S. And Our European Allies" Oliver Wright, Former Ambassador of Great Britain to the United States, Delivered to the Town Hall of California, on his "Farewell Tour", Los Angeles, California, May 20, 1986, Vital Speeches of the Day, p. 579.

the two military-political blocs passes through Europe."¹⁶² To deny this as the motivation, of not only the American presence in Western Europe, but continued Allied support of the American commitment to freedom for the West, would be naive.

Indications are that the world may be entering a post-nuclear era. "Nuclear weapons will no longer be seen as an option for defending Europe against a conventional attack. And further reductions or elimination of nuclear arms through agreement with the USSR may even become dangerous, if the balance of conventional forces remains unfavorable to the West."¹⁶³ It is doubtful nuclear weapons fail would cease to be viable options for defense of one's homeland for no other reason than "...that the two sides (US and USSR) are compelled to maintain a rough balance in strategic weapons for political reasons, even if the details are no longer crucial."¹⁶⁴

¹⁶²"Soviet Diplomacy Turns to Europe" The Current Digest Of The Soviet Press, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 29., p. 8.

¹⁶³William G. Hyland, "Setting Global Priorities" Foreign Policy, Number 73, Winter 1988-1989, p. 26.

¹⁶⁴Hyland, p. 27.

8 HOW NORDIC NWFZ PROPOSALS ARE PERCEIVED BY DENMARK, FINLAND, ICELAND, NORWAY AND SWEDEN

"The Nordic policy of the Soviet Union is one link in the whole of Soviet foreign policy. The Nordic countries are to be drawn away from the influence of imperialism, away from the 'camp of war' and over into a 'zone of peace' for one day in the future to be incorporated in the 'camp of peace'. In this process Finland has gone the furthest (sic) and is thus held up as a model for the other Nordic countries."¹⁶⁵

Each of the Scandinavian countries had individually decided not to acquire nuclear weapons or to permit stationing them on its soil in peacetime. Nevertheless, proposals for official, mutual recognition of this status, perhaps including the Soviet Union and the Baltic, have been discussed since 1959, when Khrushchev said that the Soviet Union supports the idea of setting up a rocket and atom free zone in the Scandinavian peninsula and the Baltic area.

Other countries have made similar proposals, but negotiations between countries on the idea have never taken place. The Soviet Union has repeatedly urged the creation of the zone, adding a willingness for some measures that will apply to Soviet territory. "...Icelandic ministers have been careful to note that no such scheme would work unless it includes Soviet bases on the Kola Peninsula."¹⁶⁶ When all concerned governments have expressed

¹⁶⁵Bent Jensen, "The Soviet Union and Scandinavia: Status Quo or Revision - 'Nordic Balance' or 'Nordic Peace Zone'?" Nordic Journal of Scandinavian Affairs, Volume 4:1 (1987), p. 10.

¹⁶⁶de Lee, p. 199.

interest in the Nordic NWFZ, the Soviet Union will be ready to take part in the negotiations. An easy stance to take when one considers the varying interpretations of a Nordic NWFZ found amongst the Scandinavian nations. "In no case have NWFZs managed to gain the support of all the states of a region or all of the eligible external powers."¹⁶⁷ The Nordic NWFZ is not an exception.

DENMARK. Denmark wants to be more than just a pawn between the superpowers in the nuclear warfare debate. Ironically, this is a self-imposed status as Denmark does not have nuclear weapons nor does not it allow the peacetime stationing of nuclear weapons on its soil. It expects ships carrying nuclear weapons not to visit its harbors and expects the United States to respect the Danish policy. The Social Democrats oppose unilateral declaration of Denmark as a nuclear-free zone and believe that the Kola peninsula and the Baltic should be included. The parties further to the left support a unilateral declaration.

Moscow considers Denmark politically and militarily critical to the NATO coalition. Militarily, Denmark stands at the crossroads of naval and air communication links between central and northern Europe and between the Baltic Sea and the Atlantic Ocean. "NATO strategists set aside a key role for Denmark in plans to seal off the Baltic Strait zone linking Continental Europe and

¹⁶⁷Purver, p. 12.

Scandinavia."¹⁶⁸ Politically, as one of the smaller members of the coalition and a "front-line" state, it constitutes the principal focus for the Soviet hopes to rapidly unravel the NATO coalition. "If Denmark could be convinced to opt out of a NATO/Warsaw Pact conflict, other smaller states in the Alliance might be persuaded to do the same."¹⁶⁹ A debate is ongoing within Denmark regarding its role in NATO:

"Scholars and analysts have raised the question of whether Denmark can or should play a role in a superpower conflict. A growing voice in Denmark tends to describe Denmark as a nation caught between the United States and the Soviet Union, with little to say in the outcome of a conflict."¹⁷⁰

"The structure of Danish defense expenditures is such that a substantially higher proportion of it is spent abroad than is the case for most other members of the Alliance. This is because Denmark produces virtually no armaments and fuel for its armed forces."¹⁷¹ Denmark's reliance on other nations for the production of its defense assets makes it vulnerable. "Denmark has become the focus - indeed, for some, the symbol - of 'under performance' of Alliance responsibilities..."¹⁷² This label appeals to the Kremlin,

¹⁶⁸"Nonnuclear Zones: Important Factor of European Security" 18010410B Moscow Zarubezhnoye Voennoye Obozreniye in Russian, No. 5, May 88, (signed to press 5 May 88) pp.9-12., JPRS-TAC-88-041, 2 November 1988, p. 10.

¹⁶⁹Donnelly and Petersen, p. 1047.

¹⁷⁰Paul M. Cole, "The Northern Balance, Changing Realities in Defending Northern Europe" Defense & Foreign Affairs, December 1986, p. 23.

¹⁷¹Heisler, p. 86.

¹⁷²Ibid., p. 65.

as it signals a potentially weak link in the Alliance chain. This is not so and it must remain not so, especially in light of the importance the Soviets have given to the establishment of the Baltic as a "closed sea." (See Chapter 7 for a more in-depth discussion of this issue.) NATO must counter Danish uncertainty regarding the Alliance and not allow the Kremlin more of an advantage in the Baltic than it already has. Soviet pressures have increased in Danish territorial waters and airspace thus forcing some to question Denmark's support of NATO. In summary, Denmark is the only Nordic country belonging to the European Community. It is unlikely that the Danish government would do anything to endanger its NATO membership. The Danish government seems to favor a broader European zone or at least one which includes sea areas and adjacent territories. Denmark is not alone in this sentiment. Both Norwegian and Danish Social Democrats support a Nordic NWFZ,

"...contingent upon the approval of the Atlantic alliance and fully compatible with NATO membership. Furthermore, agreement on the part of both superpowers to provide negative security guarantees for the zone would be essential. Finally, Danish and Norwegian advocates of an NNFZ (Nordic NWFZ) insist that any such zone must somehow also affect Soviet nuclear weapons in adjacent territories (particularly those deployed in the Baltic, on the Kola and in the Leningrad Military District)." ¹⁷³

FINLAND. Finland is the most zealous of the Nordic nations in its support of a Nordic NWFZ and "...has been the most consistent in

¹⁷³Bitzinger, Competing Security Doctrines And A Nordic Nuclear-Free Zone", p. 6.

its backing of a Nordic NWFZ."¹⁷⁴ This is a result of its close proximity to the Soviet Union and the special relationship that it maintains with its superpower neighbor. "Finland is a neutral country which exists in the shadow of Soviet power."¹⁷⁵ Finland agreed in its Peace Treaty with Britain, the Soviet Union and other nations (Treaty of Paris 1947) not to acquire nuclear weapons. It would refuse to accept nuclear weapons on behalf of other countries. Finland believes that a Nordic NWFZ should permit each nation to define its own security concerns and take them fully into account. The Nordic countries should receive assurances that nuclear weapons would not be used against them under any circumstances. Finland advocates participation of the leading powers in the early stages. It proposes that the Nordic countries together with the great powers seek a separate treaty arrangement covering them which would isolate them from the effects of nuclear strategy and nuclear weapons technology. The starting point should be a Nordic NWFZ.

The zone should permit each country to define its own security concerns and take them fully into account. A Nordic NWFZ should only include the maritime territorial waters. Inclusion of other maritime areas would be desirable if arrangements were made outside the treaty itself; an agreement on the Baltic would involve many countries outside the Nordic region. The treaty itself should only

¹⁷⁴Bitzinger, *Competing Security Doctrines And A Nordic Nuclear-Free Zone*, p. 4.

¹⁷⁵Taylor, Cole, p. xv.

include the Nordic countries. Some limitation by the big powers on deployment of nuclear weapons near the zone would be helpful, but any such limit should be balanced.

ICELAND. Iceland does not have a military complex but is a member of NATO and has a US base at Keflavik, where nuclear weapons may be stored in time of war. However, Iceland under no circumstances will accept nuclear weapons in times of peace. Should circumstances arise in the time of crisis or war, nuclear weapons could be stationed only with the express approval of the government.

Iceland takes the most extreme stance of the Nordic nations in the Nordic NWFZ issue. Its "rational consideration of national security...is prevented by an intense emotional horror of all things nuclear, and a refusal to admit that the safety of the republic might depend upon nuclear weapons."¹⁷⁶ This inability to consider nuclear weaponry as a viable means of defense precludes any credible input by the Icelandic government regarding the establishment of a Nordic NWFZ. Its view is a prejudiced one in which the response is consistently predictable - no nuclear weapons. Iceland wants to take part in the discussions of a Nordic NWFZ but believes that it should not be done unilaterally but only as part of a broader European context. This allows Iceland to "put the blame" on the other Nordic Alliance members and still claim a "no-nuke posture. Icelanders neither support nuclear defense nor

¹⁷⁶de Lee, p. 193.

conventional defense. They naively perceive that no defense is the best defense. Particularly frightening to Icelanders is an alliance to a nuclear superpower, "...conventional defense is irrelevant because any war would rapidly escalate to full nuclear exchange; so, alliance to a nuclear power may well guarantee destruction rather than security."¹⁷⁷

"...Iceland's role in Soviet military strategy is scenario dependent."¹⁷⁸ As such its defensive structure must be able to react to crisis from the Soviets. "Icelanders demonstrate a general awareness of the fact that the Soviet navy has expanded in recent years and that Iceland's geography makes it strategically important to NATO and to the Soviets as well. This awareness is not accompanied by any real sense of urgency concerning Icelandic security."¹⁷⁹ Iceland seeks "...mass support for the status quo..."¹⁸⁰ But what does that mean? In this changing world, continuation of the status quo may be detrimental. Icelandic sources of energy are not threatened but "some Icelanders fear they may attract multi-national concerns whose activities will damage

¹⁷⁷Ibid., p. 193.

¹⁷⁸Phillip A. Petersen, "Iceland in Soviet Military Strategy" Iceland NATO and Security in the Norwegian Sea (Reykjavik, Iceland: Boston Foreign Affairs Group and the Icelandic Association for Western Cooperation, 12-13 March 1987), p. 7.

¹⁷⁹Taylor, Cole, p. xvii.

¹⁸⁰Ibid., p. 199.

the environment and way of life."¹⁸¹ Ironically, it is because of the American nuclear guarantee that Iceland is able to maintain its level of status quo. Icelanders have failed to grasp the strategic importance of the American nuclear guarantee in the Arctic. It is unlikely that Iceland will, but as long as the United States maintains military installations there, Icelandic considerations must be incorporated in the Nordic NWFZ debate.

NORWAY. "Norway is, in many respects, Western Europe's maritime superpower. Norway controls the largest national ocean area in Europe..."¹⁸² Norway, a member of NATO, explicitly stated in a Defense White Paper in 1961 that the government does not allow stockpiling of nuclear warheads on Norwegian territory in peacetime. "Short of being able to bring about Norwegian neutrality, the Soviet government very much approves of Norway's refusal to have nuclear weapons stationed on her soil in peacetime. To consolidate and build on this favourable (sic) of Norwegian (and Danish) policy, the Soviet Union has looked with considerable favour (sic) on Finnish proposals for a Nordic nuclear-free zone."¹⁸³ But, "the Soviet Union will not accept Norwegian demands for limitations on the numbers of nuclear and conventional weapons

¹⁸¹de Lee, p. 199.

¹⁸²Baard Bredrup Knudsen, "Norway: Security Dilemmas and Current Issues," Evolving European Defense Policies. Edited by Catherine M. Kelleher and Gale A. Mattox. D.C. Heath and Company/Lexington, Ma./Toronto: Lexington Books, 1987), p. 296.

¹⁸³Brenchley, p. 13.

on the Kola Peninsula, which are a condition for a nuclear-free zone in the area. On the other hand, the Soviet Union is prepared to hold talks on a nuclear-free Baltic."¹⁸⁴

Interestingly, ships with nuclear weapons may call in ports for brief periods but Norway will not permit the peacetime stationing of foreign forces on its territory. Likewise, the storage or stationing of nuclear and chemical weapons is prohibited. Norway contends that it will base its defense upon conventional defense. "It must continue to be a stipulation that foreign warships entering Norwegian ports not carry nuclear weapons."¹⁸⁵

The Norwegian goal is the banning of the use of nuclear weapons on or against Norwegian territory. As previously stated, Norway will work toward establishment of a Nordic NWFZ as part of efforts to reduce nuclear weapons in a larger European context. Even a zone which included the Baltic and parts of the Soviet Union would not be large enough to reduce the risk of a nuclear attack on the Nordic nations.

The Norwegian Labor Party has been more enthusiastic about the zone, but said it should be considered in a wider context, for example, in connection with the establishment of a zone in Central

¹⁸⁴"Swedish Paper Reviews Komissarov Baltic Article" PM271946 Stockholm Dagens Nyheter in Swedish, 20 Feb 86, p. 17, Foreign Media, 21 March 1986, p. .

¹⁸⁵"Labor Party Reaffirms Ban On Nuclear-Armed Warships" PM271245 Oslo Aftenposten in Norwegian 24 Feb 86, p. 3, Foreign Media, 21 March 1986, p. 6.

Europe. A nuclear-weapon-free regime should also impose limitations on the nuclear powers' freedom of action. Nuclear weapons are found in areas adjacent to the four countries.

Spitsbergen, territory of Norway, is covered under an international treaty which permits signatories equal right to economic exploitation. "The land frontier between Norway and the Soviet Union is the only NATO-USSR frontier in Europe (the only other is in Asia Minor, in Eastern Turkey).¹⁸⁶ It forbids installations and the permanent stationing of military personnel. Norwegian naval vessels visit the territory from time to time, eliciting a protest from the Soviet Union.

"Norway's security is based upon several interrelated policies. The most important of these is membership in the North Atlantic Alliance. This, like neutrality for Sweden, is the cornerstone of Norwegian security."¹⁸⁷

Norway must not allow itself to fall victim to a false sense of security in its relationship with the Soviet Union for,

"There seems to be no reason to predict any sudden worsening in the Soviet Government's attitude toward Norway. Patience is one of the Kremlin's characteristics, based on the belief that history is on its side and that, given time its objectives are destined to be achieved. Nevertheless, it is clear that there are a number of changes in Norway's situation and policies which would be welcomed in Moscow and for which Soviet pressure will therefore be exerted whenever opportunity offers."¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁶Frank Brenchley, "Norway and her Soviet Neighbour (sic): NATO's Arctic Frontier," Conflict Studies, (London: The Institute for the Study of Conflict, Number 134, 1982), p. 2.

¹⁸⁷Taylor, Cole, p. xvii.

¹⁸⁸Brenchley, p. 12.

Norway's insistence that the Nordic NWFZ must incorporate a broader European context is not likely to waiver as long it remains firmly entrenched in NATO.

SWEDEN. "Since Peter's time, history has recorded a slow but steady increase of Russian and then Soviet power in the Baltic. The result over the past two decades has been that Swedish territorial integrity has been steadily and increasingly violated, posing a tremendous dilemma for this neutral nation which participated in its last war in 1813."¹⁸⁹

Sweden undertook not to manufacture or procure nuclear weapons in 1968. "They (the Soviets) appreciat(e) Swedish initiatives to preserve detente and achieve disarmament, not least the advocacy of nuclear weapons-free zones in Northern and Central Europe."¹⁹⁰ It pursued nuclear weapon research from 1952 to at least 1957, and possibly 1972. The government favors a zone which would include the Baltic and a limit on weapons in the Soviet Union aimed at the Nordic region. But the zone's international legal details should not be worked out until all the Nordic countries consider the idea realistic.

The government favors a zone which would include the Baltic and an attenuation arrangements agreement on weapons in the Soviet Union aimed at the Nordic region. But the zone's international details should not be worked out until all Nordic countries

¹⁸⁹"Sweden's Troubled Waters" Defense & Foreign Affairs, December 1985, pp 9-10.

¹⁹⁰Bent Jensen, p. 18.

consider the idea realistic. Sweden has done internal work on the zone. A Nordic NWFZ must provide equal security guarantees for all of the internal nations. Sweden "...reject(s) the idea of differential guarantees for different members of the zone, that would see the United States guaranteeing the nuclear-free status of Norway and Denmark and the Soviet Union that of Finland...(furthermore) Sweden has ruled out any kind of **positive** security guarantee (an undertaking to come to the aid of a threatened state) as being incompatible with its neutral status."¹⁹¹

Neutral Sweden has become more firmly committed to defend Swedish territory from Warsaw Pact encroachments. Sweden recognizes the insurmountable odds with which it is dealing. "Sweden's dilemma is a difficult one...how can a small, even vital nation like Sweden stand up to the Soviet Union and its military strength?"¹⁹² A Nordic NWFZ would provide Sweden with the strategic might to defend its territory.

The Nordic nations as a whole are pacifying the superpowers by signalling that they are amenable to a Nordic NWFZ. The Nordic NWFZ proposal has not progressed past the debate stage and the Nordic nations are to blame. "The debate over the linkage of a Nordic NWFZ to a broader European arrangement is not so much a dispute among ardent proponents of the zone, as it is between those proponents and others deliberately seeking to delay, if not torpedo

¹⁹¹Purver, p. 32.

¹⁹²"Sweden's Troubled Waters" Defense & Foreign Affairs, December 1985, p. 38.

altogether, the very notion of an independent zone."¹⁹³ To take a definitive stance for any of the nations past the alignment of Denmark and Norway with NATO could prove to be suicidal. The North cannot afford to offend either of the superpowers. "As for the United States' Arctic allies, for them to completely sever their connection with the nuclear weapons infrastructure of their superpower patron, given the dual- or multi-purpose nature of so much of the technology and facilities concerned, would be equivalent to cutting all of their defence (sic) links and substituting a policy of nonalignment for one of alliance."¹⁹⁴ Ironically, both superpowers cannot offend the Nordic nations. The strategic security of both superpowers are too firmly entrenched in the North. Herein lies the dilemma of the Nordic NWFZ. T h e strategic ramifications of the zone must be considered.

"...where the outer framework of the 'Nordic balance' still exists but where the reality behind the facade is quite another matter. Soviet propaganda for a nuclear-free zone can be an illustration of such a situation. Here too the process is perhaps in the short term as important as the final aim. Denmark and Norway can continue to be members of NATO, but the situation will internally be characterized by an enervating political struggle and outwardly by an uncertainty as to the credibility of the alliance."¹⁹⁵

NATO rests its strategy for defense on the North on clear options, and the Nordic NWFZ would diminish the options available to NATO for defense of the region. Touted by the Soviets as a CBM and a

¹⁹³Purver, p. 34.

¹⁹⁴Purver, p. 50.

¹⁹⁵Bent Jensen, p. 13.

means of lowering military tensions in northern Europe, the Soviet Union stands to be the only benefactor in a Nordic NWFZ, a Soviet professed "bastion of peace."

VIII. ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR WESTERN SECURITY

Limiting the cooperation between the Nordic nations as well as the cooperation between the Nordic nations and other NATO nations, particularly the United States is a prime goal for the Kremlin. The dismantling of NATO is another peacetime goal of the Soviets. "The Soviets would presumably value most highly a dispute dividing the United States and its allies in Western Europe."¹⁹⁶ But the primary objective of the Soviet Union is the elimination of the American nuclear guarantee. This is the motivation for the Soviet proposal for the establishment of a Nordic NWFZ. It has been manifested in several forms from pleas in official statements to linkage to other issues such as regional security. Should the Soviet Union be able to prove the United States unreliable as a guarantor of regional security, it could prove through "linkage" that the United States is unreliable as a guarantor of peace. The Afghanistan War has been used for this purpose. The Soviet Union contends that only through its commitment to peace and stability was an end put to the war. Moscow points to the United States continuance to supply the rebels with weapons via Pakistan. Moscow contends that as long as the United States still continues to supply arms so to it must to defend its interest in the region.

¹⁹⁶David S. Yost, "Soviet Aims in Europe", p. 75.

Soviet wartime objectives include:

Operation and protection of its SSBN force,

1. Interdiction of Strategic Lines of Communication (SLOCs) across the Atlantic Ocean,
2. Carry out advances against the key geographic areas of Northern Norway, Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK)-Norway Line and the Baltic Straits in conjunction with advance on Northern Front while avoiding the Central Front,
3. Protection and control of the Central Front is anticipated as "Upwards of 60% of the yard and docking facilities necessary for Warsaw Pact shipbuilding and repair, and a great deal of the training and trials facilities, are still to be found along the shores of the Baltic."¹⁹⁷

Moscow anticipates that both sides would be striving to destroy each other's nuclear capability during the conventional phase of a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict. The Soviet Union expects to neutralize NATO forces via conventional means without resorting to nuclear weapons. This keeps the war short and ties in with the Soviet preference of a short war versus a long, protracted conflict. The basic objective is to win the conflict while avoiding the operational use of nuclear weapons. Warsaw Pact conventional forces hold a preponderance over NATO conventional forces. Enviably is the lead in manpower and proximity that the Warsaw Pact holds. Proximity of the Warsaw Pact ensures the Soviet Union conventional forces of having the competitive advantage. It has been estimated that for the United States naval forces to respond to a Warsaw Pact offensive in Europe would require a minimum of 7 - 10 days, providing the assets are available. This

¹⁹⁷Bjarne Fr. Lindhardt, Allied Command Baltic Approaches - a Survey, p. 4.

theory assumes a cold start out of the Eastern seaboard of the United States.

The chief stumbling block to the creation of a Nordic NWFZ is the strategic significance of the region for both superpowers,

"...the Soviet Union necessarily relies to a critical degree on its Arctic territories for the basing of the most secure element of its nuclear retaliatory force, its ballistic missile submarines. It would be in the interests of neither the Soviet Union nor the West to compromise the relative invulnerability of these forces by the application of arbitrary geographic restrictions."¹⁹⁸

Exemption of this region by the superpowers is inconceivable.

A. THE BALTIC AS THE KEY

North Europeans realize the potential for Soviet control of the Baltic, should Soviet nuclear forces not be included in the proposed Nordic NWFZ. Pierre Schori, Secretary General of the Swedish Foreign Affairs Ministry stated that "in line with the Swedish position, the creation of a zone (nuclear-free) must, first of all, provide for withdrawing from the Baltic Sea all submarines with nuclear weapons...At the same time, the Swedish side never insisted on automatically counting the strategic nuclear weapons and systems in creating a nuclear-free zone."¹⁹⁹ The ban, by Western interpretation, would include both American and Soviet nuclear submarines.

Moscow is all too aware of the naval superiority of the United States and NATO over the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact in the

¹⁹⁸Purver, p. 8.

¹⁹⁹"Sweden's Schori Briefs Press on Security Issues" PM291627 IZVESTIYA 29 Jan 88, FBIS-SOV-88-019, 29 Jan 88, pp 31-32.

Nordic region. The Kremlin regards as dangerous the "process of equipping United States ships with sea based long-range cruise missiles intended for hitting targets on the territory of the Soviet Union and other Warsaw treaty countries."²⁰⁰ Moscow is concerned with increased naval and air force activities of the United States and NATO in the Baltic, North, Norwegian and Greenland Seas as well as an increase in the testing operations of "suppressing" the Soviet Navy in the vicinity of Soviet ports in the beginning stage of a possible conflict and the blockading of Warsaw Pact naval forces in their bases. There has been "...some slight movement in the Arctic"²⁰¹ by the Soviets. The Kremlin views the Baltic and the Northern Flank as a tie to its Polar strategy. The Nordic region is seen as a door to the Arctic. The Kremlin regards the United States as "going all out to realize its concept of forward-based sea frontiers in its 'Polar strategy'". This is why the USSR has proposed to discuss, first and foremost, with the states in this (Nordic) region, military threat that has been mounting there over a long period of time."²⁰² Perceived is a NATO mastering of the Arctic region as well.

²⁰⁰"News Conference Held on N. Europe Naval Proposals: Uspenskiy on Security" LD221434 TASS 22 Jan 88, FBIS-SOV-88-015, 25 Jan 88, p. 8.

²⁰¹Mackintosh, p. 60.

²⁰²"Lebedev Interviewed on Northern Europe Limits" PM211921 Moscow News No 3, 17 Jan 88, FBIS-SOV-88-015, 25 Jan 88, p. 10.

The Soviet Union would like to maintain the "nuclear free status" of Northern Europe. The designation of the Baltic Sea and its straits as a "closed sea" would greatly facilitate this objective,

The Soviets have long sought to encourage consideration of the Baltic as a 'closed sea,' from which the naval vessels of outside powers would be excluded. A 'nuclear free' Baltic could be seen as the first step toward this broader goal, but Moscow must realize that concessions far greater than the elimination of the old G-1-class submarines will be necessary in order to interest Western States in this idea."²⁰³

The Kremlin already thinks of the region as such, but seeks recognition outside the Soviet Union, more particularly by the littoral nations of the Baltic. "...the Baltic, which the Soviet Union has for years tried to turn into a kind of closed sea, free from the forces of other nations outside it."²⁰⁴ There is no United States nuclear presence in Iceland, Denmark and Norway. A Nordic NWFZ would not affect any current United States nuclear deployments unless there was a political "spillover" effect involving Central Europe or other regions. Should such a proposal be adopted under Soviet terms, gone would be the American nuclear presence in Western Europe, fragmented would be the flexible responsiveness of NATO and laid would be the foundation for Soviet domination. The United States is considered an "outsider" and not being a littoral nation of the Baltic, the Soviet Union contends,

²⁰³Purver, p. 31.

²⁰⁴Malcolm Mackintosh, "The Security Context: A Soviet View" Britain and NATO's Northern Flank, Geoffrey Till, Ed., (London: The Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1988, p. 60).

the American military presence is not warranted. Removal of the American nuclear forces from Western Europe would put the Kremlin one step closer to designation of the Baltic as a "closed sea".

1. Inner Seas Strategy

"The Baltic is neither a 'sea of peace' nor a nuclear-free zone, but both conceptions with the Soviet Union as guarantor, are evidently, politically the first steps towards an alteration of the status of the Baltic to be a closed, Soviet-dominated sea."²⁰⁵

"The zones-of-peace concept, while contributing to Gorbachev's multifaceted foreign policy efforts aimed at projecting the image of the Soviet Union as the chief architect of peace in the 1980s and 1990s, would also, if agreed to by the West, virtually eliminate the U.S. Navy's program of joint and combined exercises. By denying the United States the opportunity to practice the operations envisaged in the Maritime Strategy, the Soviet Union could seriously impair Western capability to conduct those operations under difficult wartime conditions."²⁰⁶

The operative words in this quote are "if agreed to by the West". It is highly unlikely that the United States would agree to a concept that would eliminate its program of joint exercises. The United States and the Soviet Union have different views on the subject of exercises,

"...limits on exercises while satisfactory for continental powers like the Soviet Union, are clearly impractical for historical seapowers like the United States, the United Kingdom, France, or Japan...The Soviets believe they maintain high readiness by not exercising their fleet at sea, but by maintaining an alert status in port or at an anchorage. Virtually all other navies maintaining readiness is

²⁰⁵Ibid, p. 39.

²⁰⁶David Alan Rosenberg, "It is Hardly Possible to Imagine Anything Worse": Soviet Thoughts on the Maritime Strategy", Naval War College Review, Summer 1988, p. 101.

accomplished by maximizing the amount of time they remain underway at sea in an operational status."²⁰⁷

These Soviet overtures are more than just propaganda and constitute a serious response to the challenge laid down by the American defense initiative of NATO. This type of response may be the most significant commentary produced by the Kremlin on maritime strategy. "No doubt the Soviet Union would like to have their cake, and eat it too - by closing their seas but at the same time preserving their access to other people's."²⁰⁸

Soviet desires to designate the Baltic as a "closed sea" is another attempt to brand a region off limits to the West most particularly the United States. No matter how the region is viewed by the Kremlin, the United States will not be open to such a designation. Official designation of the Baltic as a "closed sea" represents the first step in the accomplishment of a Nordic NWFZ initiative for the Soviets. It would set a dangerous precedent with irreversible consequences for designation of other regions as "off limit" zones throughout the world. Nordic regional security implications under a Nordic NWFZ during wartime would cripple defense of the North.

²⁰⁷Tritten, p. 8.

²⁰⁸Mackintosh, p. 60.

B. REPERCUSSIONS FOR THE NORTHERN FLANK IN A POTENTIAL NATO-WARSAW PACT CONFRONTATION

Danish territory "...represents the northern flank of NATO's central region."²⁰⁹ The goals of the Warsaw Pact in a potential military action are geared toward the ultimate control of the region, initially through conventional weaponry. The Alliance's vulnerable flanks would surely constitute prime focuses for Soviet military planners. Norway, Iceland and the Baltic would be the principal northern targets. Soviet objectives are not difficult to identify. Protection of Soviet SSBN sanctuaries and launch positions would be of major importance. Defense against United States carrier and cruise missile strikes directed at the Kola basing complex would follow. Warsaw Pact objectives would also be seeking access to Norwegian airfields and harbors and or denial of such to NATO, ensuring free movement to Soviet warships into Atlantic waters, neutralization or seizure of Iceland and interdiction of the SLOCs between North American and Western Europe. Protection of Soviet SLOCs as well will play a role in Soviet wartime contingencies. Despite Soviet advances in communications, technology and logistics, the West can still suppose certain problems still exist for the Warsaw Pact.

Prevention of NATO incursions into the Baltic Sea, control of the Danish Straits and amphibious assaults against the Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) sector of NATO's Central Front would be

²⁰⁹Taylor, Cole, p. xiv.

objectives as well. To carry out its wartime strategy, Moscow would rely upon on all its armed forces, including its navy. The Northern Fleet is the most formidable of the four fleets. Jonathan Alford contends that the Northern Fleet will be crucial to the Soviets in its maritime strategy during a Warsaw Pact/NATO conflict and where "the focus of attention shifts from the Baltic approaches to the Far North."²¹⁰ He contends that "Who controls the Norwegian Sea depends on who controls the North Norwegian airfields; who controls those airfields depends on who gets there first; and who gets there first depends on who controls the Norwegian Sea."²¹¹ The Soviet Union has the advantage of proximity and "prepositioning" unmatched by the United States. United States and Allied response is hampered by Norway's prepositioning restrictions.

The importance of NATO controlling the Norwegian Sea as well as Norway's coastal waters is evident. Once established in northern Norway, Soviet military forces could more effectively defend the Northern Fleet's bases. Ships, submarines and long-range aircraft, Backfires and Blackjacks would be in a far better position to interdict the sea lanes crossing the North Atlantic. A follow-on Soviet drive southward from territory seized in the North Cape would threaten a link-up with other Warsaw Pact combat

²¹⁰Jonathan Alford, "The Current Maritime Position in the Northern Fleet" Marineblad (December 1986/January 1987), p. 604.

²¹¹Ibid.

forces operating in the Baltic thus creating increased perils to the Northern Flank of NATO's Central Front. The larger amphibious forces available to the Pact in the Baltic region would be used both to assault the northern area of the Central Front and to attack Denmark as part of a campaign to seize control of the Danish Straits. "Nearly half (12 of 27) of major Soviet amphibious ships are assigned to the Baltic Fleet. They are augmented by about 40 East German and Polish amphibious ships of equal or only slightly lesser capability."²¹²

To accomplish its tasks, "the Baltic Fleet has been assigned 230 warships and 260 combat aircraft."²¹³ With the addition of amphibious assets from East Germany and Poland, the capabilities of the Western Theatre of Operations (TVD) are the most potent of the Soviet fleets. As in the case with the Northern Fleet, the Baltic's efforts would be complemented by elements from other Soviet armed forces, particularly frontal aviation providing air cover for naval bases and sea missions. Whether in the defense against Soviet incursions on NATO's Northern Flank or neutralizing gains made in the event they were successful, Allied sea power especially carrier aircraft, cruise missiles and submarines would be indispensable. Ironically, it is in these aspects of overall

²¹²Francis J. West, Jr., Jacquelyn K. Davis, James E. Dougherty, Robert J. Hanks, Charles M. Perry, Naval Forces and Western Security Special Report 1987, The Atlantic Alliance and Western Security: The Maritime Dimension, Volume 1, p. 23.

²¹³Ibid, p. 24.

Alliance defense that a lack of appreciation for the potential contribution of sea power is most apparent.²¹⁴

Problems of resupply plague NATO planners as well. It is in this arena that NATO is at another disadvantage in defense of the region. As Warsaw Pact marshals will be dependent upon the SLOCs, so too will NATO admirals, but more so. The Warsaw Pact has the advantage of closer proximity to its home bases. Even though NATO allies will assist in the resupply effort, it is well-known that NATO's pre-positioned reserves are inadequate. General Kroesen, cites "shortage of ammunition"²¹⁵ and remembers that when he came to office he found,

"a terrible shortage in our (NATO) war reserve stocks...in the major assemblies needed for maintaining tanks and trucks and armored personnel carriers - transmissions, engines, final drives etc. We (NATO) had stockpiles of 30, 40, or 60 days of ammunition or C rations, but we (NATO) had zero days or one or two days of stocks of those major assemblies."²¹⁶

The General cites "limitations on money and the lack of priority for the procurement of those parts or assemblies for distribution to war reserve stocks in Europe"²¹⁷ as the culprit. Complicating NATO's reinforcement/resupply dilemma is the inability to sustain a protracted defense as a result of the imbalance in conventional forces between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. General John R. Galvin, USA, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) substantiates this,

²¹⁴Ibid.

²¹⁵Roos, p. 65.

²¹⁶Ibid.

²¹⁷Ibid.

"At this moment I can guarantee only that we (NATO) can defend ourselves for two weeks against an all-out Warsaw Pact attack - then we will have to use nuclear weapons. Therefore, ²¹⁸the conventional capability of NATO must be reinforced..."

The Baltic and its Approaches are critical to deciding the outcome in a potential NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict. NATO control of the region would provide the West with a fair chance for victory in a NATO/Warsaw Pact conflict otherwise such a conflict is lost for the West. The shift in region of late has been in favor of the Warsaw Pact with little indication of a reversal. Critical reevaluation of Western strategy for the region is demanded.

Admiral Baggett, previously cited, stated:

"There is no reason to have maritime forces unless they support the land strategy, where we live, and that takes several forms - the reinforcement and resupply of Europe, direct support of the northern flank, and protection of the economic shipping of both North America and the European Allies...**to win the land campaign in Europe, we must win the maritime campaign in the Atlantic.**"²¹⁹ (Emphasis added)

But in order to win the maritime campaign in the Atlantic, NATO must beat the Soviets. In order to defeat the Soviets, NATO must seize control of the Central Front by seizing control of the Baltic in the initial stage of a Warsaw Pact/NATO conflict. This would assure control of the Northern Flank which in turn would yield the decisive advantage to NATO.

"Lose the war quickly on the Central Front and there is no long war to fight...perceptions of weakness on the flanks can only encourage the Soviet Union to believe that they could turn the centre (sic) if it did show signs of holding; and,

²¹⁸Henrywan Loon, "An exclusive AFJI interview with: General John R. Galvin, USA, Supreme Allied Commander Europe" Armed Forces Journal International, March 1988, p. 50.

²¹⁹Benjamin F. Schemmer, p. 69.

second, the Atlantic Bridge must be kept open if NATO is not to lose a longer war even if it were to withstand the first shock...the Atlantic Alliance cannot choose what it will defend. **Forward defense is not a guiding principle only for the Central Front.**"²²⁰ (Emphasis added)

Forward defense is the key to the defense of Western Europe. In terms of Western European security forward defense translates to the American nuclear guarantee but the American Navy's maritime strategy suggest otherwise. NATO can not afford to lose Denmark, or any of the nations contiguous to the Central Front, as part of its defensive framework. A Nordic NWFZ would not only eliminate the nations of the Central Front, militarily and politically, from the Alliance but it would eliminate the American nuclear guarantee and as such, the flexible response of NATO. "Soviet political and military leaders have long felt that war is an acceptable risk only if NATO's nuclear options in the European theatre are eliminated. Consequently, it is no coincidence that the vision of a future world without nuclear weapons translates into the practical demand that the Western Alliance renounce the strategy of 'flexible response'." ²²¹

²²⁰Ibid.

²²¹A.I. Gribkov in Krasnaya zvezda, September 25, 1987, as quoted by Gerhard Wettig in "Has Soviet Military Doctrine Changed?" Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, November 20, 1987, p. 4.

IX. CONCLUSION

The Nordic NWFZ proposal is a symbolic arms control maneuver at best. The concept is doomed, for no matter how persistent Moscow is about the establishment of such a zone, the United States still remains opposed to the idea. It is doubtful that the discussion will advance past the debate stage. Each Scandinavian nation seeks autonomy within the zone and none of these nations is willing to acquiesce to another, particularly a superpower. As stated earlier, the Nordic leaders will not allow Scandinavia to be used as a superpower pawn. Definition of a Nordic NWFZ that is acceptable to all concerned nations has not been reached. Furthermore "in no case have NWFZs managed to gain support of all the states of a region or all of the eligible external powers."²²² The Nordic NWFZ does not contradict this statement.

However, the debating process itself can be useful by fostering a greater awareness in the hopes of reducing tension regarding nuclear warfare in the North,

"...the mere process of working toward the creation of a Nordic NFZ can be as important as the eventual establishment of the zone itself. Even if the goal of a nuclear-free in northern Europe is never realized, many believe that the zone concept will have served its purpose if the process of exploration and negotiation encourages increased Nordic

²²²Purver, p. 12.

cooperation and further promotes the stability and low tension of the region."²²³

This is the only success that the zone may achieve but the Nordic NWFZ debate will continue. The Soviets use the debate as a tool of political detente to enhance Soviet military detente. It is forecasted that Moscow will become more adamant in the near future regarding establishment of a Nordic NWFZ. Recent events in Eastern Europe, more particularly in the Baltic Republics provide the necessary impetus. Moscow will not and cannot afford the alignment of any of its Baltic republics with the West or Western allies. Such an alignment would diminish the likelihood of a Soviet-defined Nordic NWFZ. The United States must stand firm in its opposition to a Nordic NWFZ. A Nordic NWFZ is not in the interest of Western security.

A. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR US POLICY

The United States maintains a political edge over the Soviet Union in the North Atlantic. Should the United States be limited in its nuclear weaponry by a Nordic NWFZ then this political edge would be diminished. "The main significance of nuclear weapons is political: they impose terror on the opposing government."²²⁴ When interpreting the Soviet proposals for a Nordic NWFZ one should remember that "Moscow was historically first and foremost a land

²²³Richard A. Bitzinger, "Competing Security Doctrines And A Nordic Nuclear-Free Zone" P-7502, November 1988, p. 22.

²²⁴Norman Friedman, "Towards A New U.S. Strategy (Part I)" Defense Science, February 1989, p. 22.

power. Naval, and later air, capabilities were developed to complement that power and to integrate with it, not to challenge or supplant it."²²⁵ The Soviet Union still has "the relative advantage of landpower over seapower... (a) seapower (which) is ultimately dependent upon an adequate landbase."²²⁶ The Soviet Union wants to maintain this relative advantage. To do so, the American naval presence in the North Atlantic must be reduced. The American naval nuclear guarantee must be circumvented and a NWFZ in the Nordic region would greatly enhance the Soviet Union's chances in the attainment of such a goal.

Historically, the Soviet Union has associated survival of the state with the stability and subordination of peripheral actors. The Soviets are highly reactive to displays of instability and disloyalty along their border. A Nordic NWFZ not consistent with the Soviet proposal could be perceived by Moscow as disruptive. Sharing a common border, the Nordic region is clearly a product of vital Soviet border concerns and interest. The North's geographical proximity plays a critical role. The Soviets do not view the region as a unified whole. "...the question of what one could call the 'vicinity' of countries, of being nearby, is very important. In fact it is in some ways more important now than it was in the past because, not just for reasons of strategy but also

²²⁵C.G. Jacobsen, "Soviet strategy, the naval dimension" International Defense Review, 10/1986, p. 1431.

²²⁶Francis P. Sempa, "Geopolitics And American Strategy: A Reassessment" Strategic Review, Spring 1987, p. 29.

for reasons of ideology, to have an ideologically distinct and a hostile, even small, country on your frontier is not something the great powers like."²²⁷

Scandinavia is not hostile to the Soviet Union but as long as it remains a part of NATO the likelihood of it becoming so in a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict exists.

Former Secretary of State Shultz stated,

"I find it difficult to believe that our (US) relations with the Soviet Union will ever be 'normal' in the sense that we (US) have normal relations with most other countries. There are only two superpowers in the world. We are vastly different in the ways we view the role of the individual in our societies, and in the ways we relate to other countries. The relationship between us will always be unique. **It seems unlikely that the US-Soviet relationship will ever lose what always has been and is today a strongly wary and at times adversarial element.**"²²⁸(Emphasis added)

This is and should remain the motivation for the Alliance and all of its members. Also sought is reduction of tension between the two superpowers. NATO is not an aggressive alliance but a defensive alliance designed to protect its gains in time of war. Security can only be achieved in conjunction with one's opponent. Little analysis has been given to political regimes of the North that would result from the establishment of a Nordic NWFZ. By leaving out politics, one is ignoring the true sources of conflict and instability. It is not the nuclear weaponry but the politics

²²⁷Fred Halliday, James Sherr, ed. Soviet Power: The Continuing Challenge, p. 199.

²²⁸Shultz, p. 325.

surrounding the weaponry that is the heart of the nuclear free zone debate.

Only through the establishment of a Nordic NWFZ beneficial to NATO, Scandinavia and the United States can such a zone be envisioned. Restored would be deterrence through the credibility of nuclear threats and safeguarded would be the flexible response of NATO. "The issue of Soviet-American relations is in essence a test of the overall worth of the United States as a nation among nations. To avoid destruction the United States need only measure up to its own best traditions and prove itself worthy of preservation as a great nation."²²⁹

Norman Friedman in part two of his series, "Towards A New U.S. Strategy" addresses the need for the United States to think past containment of the Soviet Union. He states that,

"Current policy is schizophrenic. The national strategy is still Containment, but little has been done to connect Containment to actual military requirements. Nor has much been done to ask whether Containment still answers all, or most, of the requirements of current U.S. strategy. In particular, the Soviets are clearly currently the only major threat, but how long is that likely to continue to be the case? Forever? For two to three decades?"²³⁰

The world is no longer the bipolar world resulting from World War II. It is a multi-polar world whose players may or may not have nuclear weapons and whose national security objectives may or may not coincide with those of the United States. Unfortunately, the

²²⁹"X," "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs Spring 1987, p. 868.

²³⁰Norman Friedman, "Towards A New U.S. Strategy (Part II)," Defense Science, March 1989, p. 50.

United States has a pattern of "action-inaction" behavior (Soviets = action and United States = inaction) whose emphasis is upon the Soviet Union when dealing with threats to its national security. Not only the United States but the West suffers from this flaw. Allies such as the Japanese have labeled this as "wobbling" and caution the West. "We (Japanese) are most apprehensive if there occurs wobbling within the West each time General Secretary makes a peace offensive."²³¹ The United States cannot afford the reputation of a wobbler. Changing world politics demand that the West develop a unified strategy toward the Soviet Union and its initiatives.

The Soviets were willing to negotiate only when in a strong military position to do so even though current Soviet arms control initiatives may suggest otherwise. Such a strength can only be assessed by the Soviets. Should war aims expand and the Soviets not desire to avoid an admission of weakness, the willingness to negotiate will greatly been diminished. The role of the Soviet leader is intricately intertwined in this philosophy. No longer can policies of the Soviet Union and its leaders be predicted. Pragmatic, reasonable solutions as defined by the Kremlin are stressed. The Soviet Union is still willing to intervene in an area wherever it feels threatened yet it is also willing to withdraw from an area if it is advantageous to do so politically.

²³¹"Japan Announces New Defense Spending Policy" Foreign Broadcast Information Services, 27 Jan 87, OW241329 Tokyo Kyodo in English 1313 GMT 24 Jan 87, p. C-1.

The Soviet Union will do whatever is necessary to further its objectives whether a proven success or not, even if it appears to border on 'Westernization'.

Rejuvenated Soviet leadership had proven that "no American president can base his policies for dealing with the USSR on the presumed intentions of a Soviet general secretary. We cannot predict whether his intentions may radically change under political pressure."²³² World relations, most particularly past negotiating initiatives of the United States, when dealing with the Soviet Union, require careful evaluation and consideration and can only provide historical guidance versus a forecast.

As Vice Admiral Charles R. Larson, U.S. Navy, now Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet states,

"Once a mutually agreed upon arms control regime for land forces has been established that enhances stability in Europe, then the Western allies can examine the possibility of limitations on naval forces as they would affect the European balance of military power."²³³

This is not only true of arms control agreements in general but regional arms control limitations such as the Nordic NWFZ. Needed is a more consistent policy that does not leave the American nation vulnerable to the demands of other nations.

²³²Henry Kissinger and Cyrus Vance, "Bipartisan Objectives for Foreign Policy" Foreign Affairs (Summer 1988) p. 903.

²³³Vice Admiral Charles R. Larson, U.S. Navy, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans, Policy and Operations) in a statement before the Seapower Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on Naval Arms Control, April, 1989, p. 6.

The Soviets are masters of their own fate and as such their own foreign policy. As cited earlier, "the Soviet Union is not a status quo power - and cannot be so according to its own image of itself. For the ruling class of the nomenklatura international politics as all other politics, consists of a perpetual struggle."²³⁴ Regardless of the depth of Western analysis, it still fails to provide the definitive key to Soviet ideological or foreign policy objectives. Yet should pragmatism fail for the Soviets they are above to resorting to some of their old tricks. Soviets display a 'Potemkin-like' manner in dealing with foreigners. This same trait is found in dealing with the United States in the resolution of arms control issues. "Facade-building" is a frequent characteristic of Soviet negotiations. "New Thinking" would exempt the Nordic NWFZ proposal from this pattern. The West has yet to see proof of this.

The Soviet Union is the inferior superpower, politically and economically and it understands this all too well. Moscow has reverted back to its policy of 'Potemkinism' or facade building via deception. Hedrick Smith in his book, The Russians relays a conversation in which a Soviet government consultant explains the 'Potemkinism' of the Soviets:

"We do it naturally,...It is to our advantage. Deceit is a compensation of inferiority between foreigners. As a nation, we can not deal with others equally. Either we are more powerful or they are. And if they are, and we feel it, we

²³⁴Bent Jensen, "The Soviet Union And Scandinavia: Status Quo Or Revision - 'Nordic Balance' Or 'Nordic Peace Zone'?" Nordic Journal of Scandinavian Affairs, Volume 4:1 (1987), p. 9.

compensate by deceiving them. It is a very important feature of our (Soviet) national character."²³⁵

This is an excellent summarization of Soviet objective not only in arms control issues such, as the Nordic NWFZ, but in Soviet foreign policy, generally. Realizing it is operating from a level of inferiority and therefore at a disadvantage, the Kremlin has opted for the proven avenue of deceit. Moscow is giving the impression of force reductions in Europe and conforming to Western wishes of arms control. The bottom line remains, only the Kremlin knows what Soviets intentions are. One is reminded of the old adage of having your cake and eating it too. If the Soviets can convince the United States and Scandinavia of its "sincerity" in the arena of nuclear arms control, with minimal sacrifice, it has accomplished its objective. "...as NATO remains a defensive alliance that which we (the United States) perceive as a reality matters not so much as what the Soviets believe."²³⁶ No matter how NATO and its members perceive the Alliance, its defense is measured in the Soviet perception of the Alliance. The same applies for the Nordic NWFZ. The Nordic NWFZ is a concept that must incorporate political and military ramifications.

The United States must ensure that the Nordic nations collectively oppose the Nordic NWFZ. The two neutral states of Finland and Sweden remain vulnerable. Their close proximity to

²³⁵Hedrick Smith, The Russians, p. 21.

²³⁶Phillip A. Petersen, "Iceland in Soviet Military Strategy", p. 8.

the Soviet Union will make them critical counterweights for either superpower in the Nordic NWFZ debate. The United States through NATO must preserve its vital economic, political and military objectives in the Northern Flank. Flexible naval forces and strong political and economic ties to the governments of the nations bordering on the Baltic are essential. Strong NATO naval forces operating in the waters of the Baltic must be seen as guarantors of the West's strategic aims and interests. A Nordic NWFZ would prevent this.

Moscow will continue to use the Nordic NWFZ debate as a political tool for the enhancement of Soviet military detente. It is forecasted that Moscow will become more adamant in the near future regarding adoption of a Nordic NWFZ in light of current events in Eastern Europe, the bid for German reunification and the cry for independence in the Baltic Republics. The Soviet Union will not willingly tolerate additional democratic nations so close to its border, particularly those that favor the West, to be non-aligned nuclearly with either camp or aligned nuclearly with the West. A Nordic NWFZ is not in the best interest of US national security. Adoption of such a zone would abolish the American nuclear security guarantee for the North.

Politics not the geographic designation the define an area as a Nuclear Free Zone (NFZ). As previously stated, it is the politics that is at the heart of the Nordic NWFZ debate. Recognition of a Nordic NWFZ must be by all nations, external as well as internal otherwise a Nordic NWFZ is meaningless. If Soviet

Union is not willing to relinquish its "nuclear hold" of the North, the viability of the zone is eliminated. Subsequent ramifications for regional security cannot be overlooked.

Consideration also must be made for those nations which border the zone but are not part of the zone for their security is intrinsically tied to the Nordic NWFZ. Sanctions against the possible use, storage or transit of nuclear weapons through their territories must be broached. The Nordic NWFZ debate is multifaceted and to expect that all nations affected by the zone can reach a unilateral agreement is ambitious at best.

The Nordic nations are taking a more active role in their own politics and as such are developing a much more sophisticated view of their strategic significance to Western security. The Nordic proposal as it stands will not win acceptance by Scandinavia. A Nordic NWFZ is a step back for Western security rather than a step forward. Infringement upon the national security of a region by a geographic "stand off zone" such as the Nordic NWFZ contradicts Western security objectives. A Nordic NWFZ is an inequitable concept that only perpetuates the "Zero-Sum Gain" mentality.

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